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Abstract 
 Much of modern state and federal government social services are provided through 
contracts and grants with human service nonprofit organizations (NPOs). Significant research 
has explored how government bureaucrats alter and effectively create public policy through their 
implementation choices. I argue that NPOs also alter public policy through their implementation 
of government contracts and grants. Through an in-depth single case study of a Vermont New 
American-serving NPO1, I explore how the organization both conforms to government standards 
of accountability and alters or resists government policy restrictions that would have a negative 
effect on the community. I find that the case study NPO alters public policy by integrating new 
grants into existing programming and by using information asymmetry to expand program scope 
and client eligibility standards. However, the NPO is limited in their autonomy to negotiate 
changes in programs regardless of the quality of the relationship with a government funder and 
there is trend towards increasingly strict accountability requirements that may further limit NPO 
policy influence.  
 
 
  
                                                          
1 New Americans is a term which refers to all foreign-born people currently living in the United States, regardless of 
immigration status. 
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Introduction 
In 2012, federal, state, and local governments in the United States distributed $81 billion 
dollars to human service nonprofit organizations (NPOs) (Pettijohn, Boris, De Vita, & Fyffe, 
2013). At all levels of government, human service NPOs are paid to implement social policy 
through grants and contracts (ibid). This is especially true in the policy arena of refugee services. 
The Refugee Act of 1980 mandated devolution of social services provisions for refugees to the 
state level and incentivized the use of NPOs for service delivery (Benson, 2016).  
Much of the literature on NPO-government partnership has emphasizes NPOs’ “resource 
dependence” on the government (Knutsen, 2017; Selsky & Parker, 2005; Salamon, 1987). These 
authors suggest that the reliance of NPOs on government funding force them to carry out 
government policy objectives and follow strict accountability standards (Knutsen, 2017; Selsky 
& Parker, 2005; Salamon, 1987). However, there is also significant evidence from the fields of 
public management and nonprofit studies that NPOs alter, bend or even ignore government 
standards and expectations when those expectations conflict with the organization’s mission 
(Wiley & Berry, 2018; Arvidson & Lyon, 2014; Bar-Nir & Gal, 2011; DeHoog, 1990; Fyall, 
2017).  
Yet, the policy implications of these actions have rarely been explored (Fyall, 2017). 
Most of the research on NPOs and policy focuses on their role as advocates and activists who try 
to nudge the government into different policy directions (Young 2001). However, NPOs also 
develop and alter policy through the implementation of government policy objectives. Scholars 
of public policy have long acknowledged that policy is created in part by those the government 
employees who implement it at the “street-level”, but few researchers have extended these 
considerations to NPO grantees (Lipsky, 2010; see also Matland, 1995).  
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There is reason to believe that NPO service providers will act in different ways than 
government service providers as implementors of public policy. First, NPO service providers 
generally have specific missions that may not align with the government’s overall goal of 
providing equitable services to the general public (Fyall, 2017; Smith & Lipsky, 1993). 
Moreover, the systems of contracting and accountability that NPO partners must adhere to are 
different from the systems of accountability present in a hierarchal bureaucracy (Fyall, 2017; 
DeHoog, 2012; Van Slyke, 2006).  
In this paper, I examine how NPOs create public policy through strategic implementation 
choices, using the case study of a small refugee and immigrant serving NPO.  Specifically, I will 
explore how this organization both conforms to government standards of accountability and 
alters or resists government policy restrictions that would have a negative effect on the 
community.  To what extent do NPOs and their staff have the ability to resist government policy 
aims, and what methods do they use to accomplish these aims?  
 This research is particularly important because it comes at a time where there is a high 
level of tension between the policy aims of the federal government and the objectives of refugee-
serving NPOs. The primary goal of the case study organization is to provide support and 
opportunity for New Americans. In contrast, President Trump has displayed a high degree of 
animus towards immigrant and refugee communities, frequently alleging that refugees could be 
ISIS operatives, despite lack of evidence for such claims (National Immigration Law Center, 
n.d.; White, 2016). Therefore, there is likely to be a high degree of conflict between the policy 
objectives of the federal government and that of the case study NPO. Policy implementation 
theory suggests that in areas of high conflict between government policy and the aims of low-
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level bureaucrats, bureaucrats are more likely to attempt to resist the policy and act as policy 
creators (Matland, 1995).  
 To examine the public policy influence of the case study NPO, I use a mixed-method 
analysis of archival grants documents and interviews with NPO staff members and government 
partners who manage grants held by the organization. First, I explore previous research in the 
fields of nonprofit studies, public management and public policy. Then, I describe the historical 
background of immigration and refugee policy. Third, I explain the unique features of the case 
study organization, specifically examining its status as an ethnic community-based organization 
(ECBO). Finally, based on my research, I argue that the case study NPO and its staff make 
public policy in significant but limited ways. Specifically, I find that the NPO is able to alter 
program scope and eligibility requirements to serve a broader range of clients more fully. 
However, their influence is limited because of their own resource constraints, as well as by 
multi-level restrictions imposed from the federal government. Moreover, I find that there is little 
direct evidence of the impact of current Trump administration policies, but that there is a larger 
general trend towards stricter methods of accountability that may limit NPO policy influence. 
  
  
6 
 
1. Literature Review 
Scholars have long struggled to find a single definition of an NPO. Laville et. al. broadly 
differentiate civil society organizations from for-profit enterprises based on four main features 
(Laville, Young, & Eynaud, 2015). In contrast to for-profit enterprise, these organizations have 
decision-making power derived from participation in activities, common shared goals, an 
organization which is influenced by stakeholders rather than shareholders, and no distribution of 
residual profits (ibid). Similarly, Smith & Lipsky define community organizations as organized 
groups that represent and act on shared values through voluntary action (Smith & Lipsky, 1993). 
However, they stop sort of calling these groups NPOs because legally, within the United States, 
organizations must file IRS forms to be considered a tax-exempt NPO (ibid). Regardless of 
whether non-recognized groups should properly be considered NPOs in academic sense, this 
thesis focuses primarily on legally recognized groups because such legal recognition is a 
prerequisite for receiving almost any type of government funding.   
Furthermore, NPOs can serve many purposes beyond social services, such as religious 
groups, clubs, arts organizations, and cultural groups (Smith & Lipsky, 1993; Jenkins, 1980). 
However, because the focus of this thesis is on social service provision through grants and 
contracts, the remainder of the literature review consists largely of authors analyzing NPOs 
which provide social services. 
Early theories of NPOs did little to account for government and NPO partnerships. 
Economic theories emphasized NPOs ability to provide services that could not be produced by 
the government or the market. Weisbrod’s government failure theory suggests that NPOs exist to 
provide services that would not be attractive to the most voters, and thus are not provided by 
government policy (Weisbrod, 1977).  In a similar vein, Hansmann’s contract failure theory 
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suggests that NPOs exist because for certain services, consumers cannot gather adequate 
information to make a good choice in the free market (Hansmann, 1980). In this situation, NPOs 
are more trustworthy than for-profit firms because they have no reason to cut quality as they 
cannot profit from the services provided (Hansmann, 1980). Political theories also emphasize 
NPOs as separate entities from the government which serve as political advocates for the values 
and policy preferences of specific communities (Smith & Lipsky, 1993). None of these 
perspectives is wrong, as some NPOs do exist to provide services that the government does not 
or explicitly to oppose government policy choices (Young 2001; Najam 2000). However, they 
fail to consider the role of NPO-government partnerships (Young 2001; Najam 2000).   
Failing to consider the role of government-NPO partnerships is a major issue for any 
theory about NPOs. Beginning in the 1960s and 1970s, the government rapidly increased the 
funding for social services as a result of the War on Poverty, a policy initiative to eliminate 
poverty through provision of social services (Smith & Lipksy, 1993 p.84; Grønbjerg, 2001). 
Because states could increase the amount of funding they received by partnering with an NPO 
that provided matching funds, much of this money was channeled into NPOs, thus dramatically 
increasingly the scale and scope of government-NPO partnerships in social services (Smith & 
Lipsky 1993 p.54-56). In the 1980s, the landscape for social services was altered drastically 
again by the popularization of neoliberal ideology. Neoliberalism is sometimes viewed as 
primarily about deregulation (Peck & Tickell, 2002). But just as importantly, neoliberalism also 
restructured the ways in which government is perceived and how it functions (ibid). 
Neoliberalism has had three main impacts on the provision of social services through NPO-
government contracts. First, neoliberal discourse promotes the idea that market failures are 
minimal, and that welfare discourages hard work, ideas which have led to massive cuts in 
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funding for social services (Keevers et. al., 2008). Because they believe that government is 
intrinsically inefficient, neoliberal reformers “devolved” funds and responsibility for social 
services to state and local governments (Grønbjerg, 2001; Smith & Lipsky, 1993). Finally, 
neoliberal discourse suggests that market competition is the most efficient form for all services, 
and thus suggests that social services should be provided through a market-like contracting 
process, with an emphasis on high levels of accountability and strict contract terms (Keevers et. 
al., 2008; Schmid, 2004; Bradford, 2003).  
Together, these changes have created a “hollow state” in which governmental agencies 
rely on other governmental agencies, NPOs, or for-profit companies to provide social services, 
creating layers of separation between the source of funds and the ultimate recipient (Milward & 
Provan, 2000). In many situations the source of funds is federal, which is then given to a state 
agency, who then makes a contract with an NPO or a for-profit company to provide services 
(ibid). This system is also known as third-party governance (Salamon, 1987). 
Beyond the political discourses of neoliberalism, third-party governance also serves a 
number of other strategic purposes for governmental actors in politics. By contracting out 
services to NPOs, government effectively masks the government’s role in service provision to 
clients and citizens (Salamon, 1987, Smith & Lipsky 1993, Schmid, 2004). This reduces the 
ability of citizens to hold the government accountable for program actions and consequences 
(Salamon 1987, Smith & Lipsky 1993, Schmid, 2004). Politically, it also protects politicians 
from the backlash they might face for increasing the size of the government while allowing them 
to increase the scale of potentially popular public services (Salamon, 1987). Creating a 
separation between government and service provision can also be a strategic way to discourage 
people from thinking of welfare as an entitlement, making it easier to cut or charge for services 
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later on (Schmid 2004). Finally, government actors may see third-party governance as a way to 
include multiple stakeholders and provide more culturally responsive services (Bradford 2003; 
Smith & Lipsky 1993). 
Third-party government theory explains why governments would support government-
NPO partnerships. But why do NPOs pursue these relationships? Salamon suggests that NPOs 
participate in government-NPO partnerships primarily because the NPO sector lacks effective 
funding, especially in times of economic hardship when services are most needed (Salamon, 
1987). In one sense this funding can be critically important for providing services and creating 
new programs. Yet, such relationships may have consequences for the political mission of NPOs.  
Particularly, many authors argue that NPOs’ resource dependence on the government as a 
source of funding has a negative impact on their ability to be advocates for their community. 
Receiving government funding creates a tension between the desire to criticize government 
actions that harm NPOs clients and communities and the NPOs’ reliance on government funding 
that may lead NPOs to engage in less advocacy activities (Salamon, 1987; Smith & Lipksy, 
1993; Young, 2001). A common concern shared by many authors is that government partnership 
leads to an over-professionalization of NPOs. Because governments hold the power to set 
accountability and reporting standards that require professionalized knowledge, they are able to 
force NPO culture to alter to the professional norms of government (Smith & Lipsky 1993; 
Knutsen, 2017; DiMaggio & Powell 1983). Over-professionalization is damaging to advocacy 
efforts as professionalization can de-radicalize community activists, and career NPO workers 
may be wary of aggressive advocacy so that they do not damage future career prospects within 
government (Kallman et. al. 2016; Smith & Lipksy 1993). Another concern of resource 
dependence is that NPOs’ mission to the community may be warped by the desire to pursue 
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funding sources above all else (Salamon 1987; Salamon & Toepler, 2012; Smith & Lipsky 
1993). This may also lead in a shift in NPO advocacy from advocacy for the community to 
advocacy to maintain current levels of funding (Smith & Lipsky, 1993). Finally, some authors 
worry that resource dependence will result in a “new paternalism” where NPOs become 
primarily focused on controlling client behavior rather than community empowerment due to 
government norms and funding requirements (Keevers et. al., 2008). For example, NPOs 
providing welfare-to-work services often found themselves forced to provide the same 
paternalistic welfare programs despite desires for client empowerment due to the requirements of 
their contracts (Hasenfield & Powell, 2004). 
However other authors reject the idea that resource dependency intrinsically leading to 
less advocacy on theoretical grounds. Najam argues that while government partnerships might 
change the forms of advocacy an NPO chooses, with an emphasis on less conflictual methods, 
the amount of advocacy may be the same (Najam, 2000).  
Empirical evidence for resource dependence is mixed (Salamon & Toepler, 2012). This is 
in part because defining advocacy activities is difficult, and thus studies looking at advocacy 
may find different results depending on what activities are considered advocacy (Smith & 
Pekkanen, 2012).  Looking at European countries, Bloodgood & Tremblay-Boire find that even 
when government does not intend to suppress advocacy, NPOs that receive funding are 
nonetheless less likely to engage in lobbying activities (Bloodgood & Tremblay-Boire, 2017). In 
Belgium, Verschuere & De Corte find that receiving federal government funding is associated 
with a decrease in advocacy but receiving money from local sources is associated with an 
increase in advocacy (Verschuere & De Corte, 2015). In the US context, Smith & Pelliham find 
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that larger organizations which receive more government funding are more likely to engage in 
advocacy (Smtih & Pelliham, 2012). 
Resource dependence is obviously a significant concern for NPOs who are partnered with 
government. However, given the mixed results of studies looking at resource dependence there is 
no reason to believe that NPOs will stop working towards their own policy goals while in 
partnership with government. 
In terms of advocacy, NPOs have developed methods of increasing their own power to 
reduce resource dependence. One such strategy is policy or advocacy coalitions. Policy 
coalitions are groups of multiple NPOs within a given service area or policy field who come 
together to form a single advocacy group (Fyall, 2016). These coalitions can reduce NPO 
resource dependency by allowing NPOs to engage in advocacy while using the coalition as a 
method of protecting each coalition member from retribution for critical stances (ibid).  
Additionally, NPOs have other sources of power that can sometimes counter resource 
dependency. In some instances, NPOs act as “funding levers”, where state and local governments 
are to access more funds from government or private sources than they would be otherwise able 
to because of their partnership with an NPO (Fyall, 2016). In this scenario, NPOs can use their 
power as a source of additional funds to promote their own policy goals (ibid). NPOs can also 
gain power by being a provider of a niche service or by being the only NPO provider of a service 
in a given area (Hasenfield & Powell, 2004; Bar-Nir & Gal, 2011).  
While there is significant research on NPO resistance to government policy objectives 
through advocacy, there has been less attention to other ways NPOs can resist government policy 
objectives through government contracts and grants. On one level, NPOs achieve policy goals by 
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providing specific policy-related feedback about the programs they are running to government 
partners (Fyall, 2017; Kellerher & Yackee, 2009; Verschere & De Corte, 2015). Beyond this, 
NPOs can often influence public policy through the act of implementation of government 
contracts and grants.  
The earliest theories of policy implementation treated implementation as fundamentally a 
top-down process which was successful when those at the ground-level accurately implemented 
whatever the law set out to do (Mazmann & Sabier, 1983). For believers in top-down 
implementation, the act of implementation should be distanced from the process of policy 
making (Osburne, 2006). There is some validity to this perspective. Normatively, in a democratic 
society the public should set priorities through democracy, and policy implementors should be 
held accountable to the policy priorities (Salamon, 1987). However, as many authors have 
recognized, the policy preferences of the public which are expressed through specific policies 
and rules are rarely clear, obvious, or intended to cover every possible scenario (Lipsky, 2010; 
Stone, 2012; Matland 1995; Hupe & Hill, 2016). In fact, polices are often deliberately written to 
be ambiguous because the people who created and voted on the policy itself have different 
notions of what the policy should do or how they should do it (Matland 1995; Stone, 2012).  
Therefore, to implement most policies, policy implementors are likely to shape and alter that 
policy as there is no one clear policy they should follow. 
As opposed to a top-down perspective on implementation, Lipsky argues that 
implementation is a bottom-up process (Lipsky, 2010). Lipsky contends that low-level 
bureaucrats who are in charge of distributing resources make policy through their choices about 
who to distribute resources to and what resources will be distributed to them (ibid). These 
workers, who Lipsky calls “street-level bureaucrats”, have this control of policy because their 
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jobs require them to have significant discretion and autonomy in the distribution of inherently 
limited resources, discretion and autonomy which derive from the fact that rules cannot be made 
that accurately cover all situations they must deal with and because outcomes in human services 
are difficult to measure (ibid). While empirically Lipsky acknowledges that street-level 
bureaucrats make policy, normatively Lipsky sees this as potentially problematic because 
allowing bureaucrats discretion can lead to a privileging of certain clients who are seen as more 
“worthy” (ibid). However, this discretion can also be used by bureaucrats to resist immoral 
policies (ibid). Importantly, Lipsky is not arguing that street-level bureaucrats make policy in a 
vacuum, rather that they make and change policy within the larger policy context (ibid). 
Beyond the dichotomy of top-down and bottom-up implementation, Matland argues that 
the degree to which implementation is driven from the top or bottom depends on the amount of 
ambiguity in the policy and the amount of conflict the policy generates (Matland, 1995). Policies 
which have low conflict and low levels of ambiguity typically have a top-down administrative 
implementation which is likely to be successful as long as sufficient resources are devoted to 
implementation (ibid). When ambiguity is low but conflict is high, implementation is likely to be 
highly political with top-down policymakers needing significant political power to coerce 
implementors into implementing the policy as specified (ibid). When ambiguity is high but 
conflict is relatively low, implementation tends to be experimental and policy is driven primarily 
by the bottom-up and local contextual factors determine the success of implementation (ibid). 
Finally, when conflict and ambiguity is high, policies tend to be implemented symbolically and 
the strength of the coalition of bottom-up implementors determines the type of implementation 
and how successful it is (ibid). Matland’s theory problematizes the simple dichotomy of top-
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down and bottom-up implementation and points to the importance of understanding the policy 
context in understanding how implementation shapes policy. 
Beyond the policy context, the ability and ways in which NPOs shape policy through 
implementation are likely to depend on the type of contracting relationship the NPO and the 
government agency have entered into. The ideal neoliberal model suggests that the contracting 
environment should be a competitive marketplace of providers frequently bidding so that the 
government can receive the lowest price and most efficient services (DeHoog, 2012). This 
competitive contracting model does not distinguish between NPOs and for-profit firms, allowing 
both to place bids (Salamon & Toepler, 2012). Once a contract is created, it is expected that the 
NPO partner will be held to strict account with clear performance standards based on a complete 
specification of service requirements created by the government (DeHoog, 2012). Beyond just 
neoliberalism, the theoretical basis for this type of relationship is rooted in theories of new public 
management (NPM). NPM emphasizes control through business-like management structures, 
prioritizing professionalization and managerialism over community knowledge (Keevers et. al., 
2008; Osburne, 2006).  
While NPM-style competitive contracting emphasizes strict adherence to rules 
unilaterally set by the government, it does provide some opportunity for NPO agency. The 
principal-agent model suggests that the when a principal contracts with an agent, the agent can 
take advantage of the fact that there is an information asymmetry between them which favors the 
agent (Van Slyke, 2006). That is, the principal cannot ever fully monitor the agent, and the agent 
can use this fact to follow its own agenda (ibid). Typically, it is assumed that agents will 
maximize their own resources in P-A theory, but NPOs may also use information asymmetry to 
achieve political gains (ibid).  
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While competitive contracts are often the ideal for neoliberal politicians implementing a 
contracting system, government contracts rarely actually follow this system for a number of 
logistical and practical reasons. First, for many social services there are not enough providers to 
actually have a competitive marketplace (DeHoog, 2012). When there are only a few providers 
for a particular service, these providers have no incentive to provide low-cost services in a 
competitive model as there are likely no feasible alternatives and the system breaks down (Bar-
Nir & Gal, 2011). Second, this process assumes that both government and NPO have at least 
somewhat sufficient resources to participate in this contracting and monitoring system each year 
(DeHoog, 2012). Government agencies rarely have the resources for intensive monitoring of 
social service contracts (Van Slyke, 2006). Moreover, even with significant resources it is very 
difficult to measure the quality of human services (Smith & Lipsky, 1993). These problems are 
further exacerbated by the fact that the nature of competitive contracting encourages 
overpromising on what an NPO can deliver in order to receive the contract (Van Slyke, 2006). 
Finally, because this process requires the government to set out the terms of the contract before 
the bidding process begins, there is very little flexibility in the contract to adapt to shifting needs 
and priorities throughout the contract term (DeHoog, 2012). This is problematic because 
government agencies cannot always predict how client needs will change over the course of the 
contract (ibid). 
Oftentimes collaborative contracting models are used, as these models take into account 
low level of resources and the need for flexibility in the provision of social services (DeHoog, 
2012). While competitive contracting models are associated with NPM, collaborative contracting 
models are associated with New Public Governance (NPG), a theory which emphasizes the 
importance of relationships between actors and the trust and reputation that actors build over 
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time (Osburne, 2006). Two theories about NPO-government partnership and contracting take this 
perspective. The first is network governance. Network governance emphasizes that in the hollow 
state, government and NPOs are connected via networks of providers (Milward & Provan, 2000). 
Milward & Provan suggest that while control and accountability are critical for maintaining 
effectiveness, so is the stability of the network and the relationships between providers of social 
services and government agencies (ibid). In this way, network governance “softens” 
neoliberalism with an emphasis on collaborative approaches and coordinated response among the 
whole government (Keevers et. al., 2008).  
A second theory of collaborative contracting is the principal-steward model. The 
principal-steward model suggests that contractual relationships involve trust and that the 
government will choose to contract with organizations that they trust and who have a good 
reputation (Van Slyke, 2012). In this model, the government and the NPO are assumed to be 
working towards the same overall political goals (ibid). This is a critical assumption because for 
collaborative models to be truly effective, the government and the NPO must agree on the 
common goals of the program they are jointly creating (Selsky & Parker, 2005; Brown & Trout 
2004). When both partners share a common goal the transaction costs are lower and less 
monitoring is required (Van Slyke 2012, Brown & Trout, 2004). Within principal-steward 
relationships NPOs can express their policy preferences by acting as a key advisor on the level 
and type of services the program should provide based on their community knowledge (Van 
Slyke 2012, Salamon & Toepler 2015; DeHoog 2012). Moreover, the NPO is frequently not held 
to the letter of the contract but is instead is trusted to change and alter the program to meet 
community needs (DeHoog, 2012).  
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The principal-agent and principal-steward models of government contracting describe 
different forms of contracting, but both can and sometimes do exist at the same time in the same 
government agency. Van Slyke suggests that in urban areas, where there is typically more 
service provider choice, government-NPO relationships start out as principal-agent (Van Slyke, 
2012). However, over time, reliable providers gain status as “preferred providers” and the 
relationship slides to somewhere in between a competitive and a true collaborative model in 
which trust and reputation are used as a heuristic to judge whether an NPO should be granted 
new contracts (Van Slyke, 2012). 
Another middle-ground between competitive and collaborative models of contracting is 
the negotiated contracting model (DeHoog, 2012). Like in the collaborative model, this model 
assumes that there are typically only a few providers to choose from in the “market” of service 
providers (ibid). However, unlike the collaborative model, the negotiated model does not require 
NPOs and government to have the same program or policy goals (ibid). Instead, the NPO and 
government negotiate over the terms of contract prior to signing an agreement (ibid). Once an 
agreement is signed, there is still some flexibility to alter the program during the implementation 
stage through another round of negotiations between the NPO and government (ibid). In this 
model, the NPO expresses their policy preferences through the negotiation process.  
Studies of NPOs demonstrate that NPOs use information asymmetry and other 
advantages they have in the contracting process to pursue their own goals. Looking at domestic 
violence advocacy NPOs, Wiley & Berry find that organizations choose the extent to which they 
will comply with government based on the potential sanctions they face if they do not comply as 
well as the importance of client needs (Wiley & Berry, 2018). When costs for noncompliance are 
high, domestic violence advocacy NPOs are likely to comply with government regulations (ibid). 
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However, they may also develop ways to appear to be in compliance without actually being in 
compliance, such as billing clients for services but telling them not to pay these bills (ibid). 
When the risk of losing funds is lower, NPOs are likely to use multiple sources of funding to find 
workarounds or loopholes to provide services while technically being in compliance (ibid). 
Finally, when NPOs have no way of reconciling client needs and contract requirements but risks 
are low, they may choose to ignore government rules entirely (ibid). For example, they may 
choose to lie on timesheets about what type of work they were doing, so that the work is funded 
(ibid). Thus, as Van Slyke theorizes, domestic violence advocacy NPOs use information 
asymmetry to provide the services they believe their clients need, rather than the services 
government policy is mandated to cover. 
Another example of policy resistance through implementation is Arvidson & Lyon’s 
study of the effects of social impact measurement on NPOs. Many NPOs dislike this form of 
evaluation because it represents a threat to the autonomy of the NPO and can often clash with the 
mission of the NPO, such as when evaluations ask for information that caseworkers feel is not 
ethical to divulge (Arvidson & Lyon, 2014) While social impact measurement represents an 
additional form of governmental control, NPOs are able to resist this control because they are 
able to exercise discretion in what to measure, how it is measured, and how to value outcomes in 
their reporting to government (ibid). NPOs harness the information asymmetry and the discretion 
afforded to them to promote their own policy objectives. 
In a study of refugee and immigrant serving NPOs, Trudeau similarly finds that NPOs 
resist government policy by working around government eligibility requirements. In a survey of 
refugee and immigrant serving NPOs in Minneapolis-St. Paul, Trudeau found that a significant 
proportion of the NPOs surveyed provided some sort of support to those not eligible for 
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government-funded programs (Trudeau, 2008). These NPOs either offered informal assistance to 
those not eligible, sought outside funding to supplement government contracts and grants to 
provide for those not eligible, or simply included people who are not eligible but left them off of 
their reports to government officials (Trudeau, 2008). Moreover, most executive directors in that 
study reported that they selectively chose grants and contracts that aligned with their 
organizational mission (ibid, p.2817).  
Similarly, Fee finds that workers at refugee resettlement agencies strategically 
“decouple” reality from the paperwork they file (Fee, 2018). This “decoupling” occurs for two 
primary reasons. First, caseworkers must cope with an inherently constrained funding 
environment, in which what limited funding is available is conditioned on high expectations for 
outcomes and documentation of these outcomes (ibid). This results in caseworkers “decoupling” 
outcomes on paper from outcomes on reality to protect themselves from losing funding and 
therefore their jobs (ibid). Second, caseworkers “decouple” reality from paper in order to 
appease refugee clients by stretching eligibility requirements and allowing clients to receive 
supports even if they do not comply to the required steps (ibid). While caseworkers and 
government officials actually broadly agree on the goals of the refugee program, caseworkers are 
forced to take these steps because of resource constraints (ibid).  
In studies by Trudeau and Fee, refugee and immigrant-serving NPOs were able to resist 
government policy through information asymmetry by widening eligibility standards or taking 
other actions without reporting this to government partners. In both cases, the primary motive of 
these actions was to provide quality services and protect the organization from loss of funding.  
As both theoretical models of contracting and case studies of NPO resistance to certain 
government accountability standards demonstrate, NPOs have a wide variety of tools and 
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methods for resisting government policy through the implementation of that policy. Critically, 
none of these relationships resemble the hierarchal structure of government bureaucracies (Fyall, 
2017). Many authors in the field of policy implementation suggest that the theories of policy 
implementation created to describe implementation by government agencies are just as able to 
explain NPO implementation (Lipsky, 2010; Smith & Lipsky 1993). Lipsky suggests that NPO 
staff will act as street-level bureaucrats in the same way that government-hired bureaucrats will 
because of the high standards for NPO accountability and because professional norms are the 
same for both types of organizations (Lipsky, 2010). While it may be true that there are high 
standards set by government officials, as literature on contracting and NPO resistance to 
government accountability standards make clear, it is not a given that accountability is the same 
in NPOs as it is in government agencies. 
An alternative perspective which emphasizes the unique position of NPOs in 
implementation is Fyall’s advocate-provider framework (Fyall, 2017). Fyall emphasizes that 
NPOs are both implementors and advocates in the policy process, and that these two functions 
are related (ibid). As service providers, NPOs do act as street-level bureaucrats, but there are 
several important differences between them and traditional government agency street-level 
bureaucracies (ibid). First, the methods of accountability used to control NPOs are very different 
than those used in hierarchal government agencies. Fyall suggests that NPOs tend to have more 
discretion than typical for government agencies (ibid). Moreover, depending on the type of 
contracting relationship, the reputation of the provider and the resources the government has for 
monitoring, NPOs may have even more discretion and autonomy, which may lead to greater 
influence over policy outcomes. Second, NPOs have unique missions to serve particular 
communities or community needs, rather than a broad commitment to the public good (ibid). 
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This may lead NPOs to shape policy in specific ways to benefit particular community groups that 
represent their clientele (ibid). Third, unlike with government agencies, managers at NPOs are 
also likely to exhibit discretion in unique ways because of NPOs’ different accountability 
requirements and mission as compared to government agencies (ibid). Finally, NPOs might be 
different in terms of policy implementation because of their role as contractors. As Wiley & 
Berry suggest in their study of domestic violence advocacy organizations, the decisions NPOs 
make about shaping policy through implementation may depend on the perceived danger of 
losing a contract (Wiley & Berry, 2018). Thus, staff at NPOs do act as street-level bureaucrats 
and NPOs are policy implementors, but they are likely to be different in important ways from 
their counterparts in government agencies.  
Despite the power asymmetry between government and NPOs that can negatively impact 
NPOs who are partnered with government, there is some evidence that NPOs continue to express 
their policy preferences both as advocates and as implementors of public policy. Drawing from 
public policy literature, it is clear that NPOs can act as “street-level bureaucrats” who make 
public policy via their implementation choices. However, research from public administration of 
non-profit studies fields suggest that NPOs will differ from government agencies as 
implementors and this may affect how and when they shape policy according to their own 
preferences during implementation. 
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2. Methodology 
This thesis examines a case study of a single refugee and immigrant-serving NPO in 
Vermont. Typically, studies of government-NPO relations and their policy impacts use one of 
two methodological approaches. The first approach is large sample size surveys of organizations 
(Fyall & Allard, 2017; Smith & Pekkanen, 2012; Gazley, 2008; Verschuere & De Corte, 2013). 
The second method is in-depth case studies of one or more organizations using interviews, 
participant observation and archival research (Furneaux & Ryan, 2017; Arvidson & Lyon, 2013; 
Harrison, 2016; Brown & Troutt, 2004; Bar-Nir & Gal, 2010).  
For this thesis, I have selected a case study approach. Eisenhardt suggests that cases 
should be chosen in which the concept of interest is most easily observable (Eisenhardt, 1989). 
Thus, on a theoretical level, this case is suitable because the case study organization relies 
primarily on government funding and there is likely to be goal conflict between the government 
and the organization in the area of refugee social services. As such, I expected it would be more 
likely that the NPO would want to alter or change government policy.  
 On a practical level, I chose this organization in part because I had the ability to access 
information about the grant process. I began working with the case study organization last year, 
primarily assisting with the evaluation of their youth programming. Being an organizational 
insider can present certain ethical challenges as a researcher. Working at an organization can 
result in a researcher having access to privileged information that could harm an organization 
(Ybema, 2009). This is especially true in this case, as I signed a non-disclosure agreement for my 
original work. However, many researchers study NPOs they have also worked with in other 
capacities, such as being a volunteer or on the board (Fujiwara, 2005; Bloom & Kilgore, 2003; 
Fee, 2018). To try to minimize these ethical risks, I received prior approval from the Executive 
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Director for all the archival information I used, and permission from each person I interviewed. 
Additionally, while the observations I made during my initial work at the organization guided the 
direction of my thesis, I have only included information in this thesis that I received permission 
to use.  
This research examines only a single case study. Some researchers suggest that cross-
case examination of multiple cases is best because it increases the validity and generalizability of 
case study research (Eisenhardt, 1989; Harrison, 2016; Furneaux & Ryan, 2017). However, 
scholars in sociology and anthropology have long argued that a single case study allows a 
researcher to better understand the complexities of processes and systems (Smith, 2005; Yin, 
2018). In defining her concept of institutional ethnography, Smith argues that by approaching a 
case organization from the perspective of individuals through texts such as archival research and 
interviews, researchers are able to better examine how local conditions are impacted and altered 
by extralocal and translocal relations (Smith, 2005). Similarly, Schneider asserts that 
ethnography enables researchers to understand a single case in the context of a larger social 
system (Schneider, 2006). Consistent with this, scholars in nonprofit and implementation studies 
typically select single-case studies when the goal is an in-depth complex description of the 
behavior of various actors (Bar-Nir & Gal, 2011; Cornforth, Hayes, & Vangen, 2015; Vu, 
Nguyen, Tanh, & Chun, 2017; Fee, 2018). Because the primary purpose of this research is to 
understand how the macro-level systems of accountability and policy impact and are impacted 
by local-level decisions by NPO staff, the single case study approach is suitable. Additionally, to 
increase validity, I compared the case to past literature which both supports and conflicts with 
the findings from this case study (Eisienhardt, 1989; Yin, 2018). 
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 I used semi-structured interviews with NPO staff and government partners and archival 
research of the organization’s grants and contracts as the two primary methods of collecting 
empirical data. The combination of these two methods is frequently used within case study 
research (Furneaux & Ryan, 2017; Harrison, 2016; Bar Nir & Gal, 2011; Yin, 2018). There is 
widespread recognition among scholars that when multiple lines of evidence converge upon a 
theoretical conclusion, the validity of that conclusion is strengthened (Lipsey et. al., 1981; 
Caracelli & Greene; 1997; Eisenhardt, 1989; Yin, 2018).  
 I conducted semi-structured interviews with 5 government partners and 3 staff members 
at the case study organization. Interviews are frequently used in case studies of NPOs and NPO-
government relationships (Trudeau, 2007; Furneaux & Ryan, 2017; Hansfield & Powell, 2008; 
Van Slyke, 2006; Arvidson & Lyon, 2013; Fyall, 2016; Wiley & Berry, 2018; Harrison, 2016).  
As a research method, interviews provide information on the diverse experiences, behaviors, and 
opinions of participants (Dunn, 2010). In the context of a study of an organization, interviews 
can provide information on the sense-making strategies people use to understand and 
conceptualize processes and changes to those processes (Alexiadou, 2001). One limitation of 
these interviews was that there are fewer than would typically be required for a representative 
sample. However, this is less of a concern for this research because all interviewees were key 
informants, and the main purpose of the research was to understand their processes and activities, 
rather than to understand their particular opinions.  
Recruitment emails were sent out to all state and local government partners who had been 
involved in a grant or contract agreement with the case organization in the last 3 years. Contact 
information for government partners was taken from the case study organization’s archive of 
grant agreements, Because the focus was on government partners, contacts at foundations and 
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other sources of private funding were not contacted. Additionally, federal officials were not 
contacted because federal grants were less likely to have one clear point person, and federal 
officials are limited in their ability to respond to research requests. Recruitment emails for staff 
interviews were sent out to all members of the case organization who are responsible for 
managing and reporting on the outcomes of at least one grant or contract. Including as many staff 
who are involved in the grant and contract process as possible was an important aspect to this 
research, because policy is not just altered at the level of the organization but also at the level of 
the individuals who makes critical decisions about what to do and how to measure it each day 
(Smith & Lipsky, 1993; Arvidson & Lyon, 2013; Harrison, 2016).  
 Interviews were semi-structured and lasted between 15 and 45 minutes. Interviews with 
organization staff tended to be shorter than interviews with government partners. A full list of 
interview questions for both government partners and NPO staff is included in the appendix. 
Interview questions were derived from theory found in the literature. Interviews with 
government partners focused on the process of deciding which organizations receive grants and 
contracts, how they react to an NPO partner who wants to change elements of a program and 
how they hold NPOs accountable. Interviews with government partners focused on their general 
process, rather than specific grants they held with the case study NPO because many government 
partners were not comfortable speaking about their relationship with a particular organization. 
Interviews with staff and management at the case study NPO focused on how they chose which 
grants to pursue, how they go about making changes in programs, and how they manage 
government accountability standards and eligibility requirements.  
To maintain confidentiality, names, positions and specific details about programs have 
been removed from the interview transcripts. Additionally, all participants were sent a copy of 
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their interview transcript and given the opportunity to strike any part of their interview from the 
transcript. One of the challenges of maintaining the confidentiality of all participants was that the 
number of New American-serving NPOs in Vermont is very small. Therefore, I have chosen to 
avoid referencing specific examples in my findings when I felt that those examples could 
jeopardize confidentiality.  
Interviews were coded using codes first deductively determined from the literature on 
NPO-government relations and then refined through an iterative process of examining the 
literature and key themes within the interviews themselves. From 12 thematic codes, I derived 11 
main themes, which are discussed in the findings section. 
In addition to interviews, I collected information on 140 grants or contracts from the 
years 2006-present, including looking at grant proposals, agreements, evaluation and 
performance measures and other related documentation. Archival research complements 
interview data in part because documents “exist separately in time and place from their author” 
and thus can serve as a window into past decision-making and thinking that cannot easily be 
accessed from an interview occurring in the present day (Bar Nir & Gal, 2011).  
Proper analysis of this research presented some challenges. While this data encompasses 
a large amount of information, it may not be representative of grants and contracts held by the 
organization overall. For example, it is possible that documentation was kept for larger grants, or 
that certain types of grants or contracts required more documentation. Therefore, more complex 
statistical analyses are not necessarily appropriate.  Instead, I primarily used the archival research 
to show areas of convergence with interviews to increase the validity of those findings. 
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While this archival research provides an important view of what occurred, there are 
theoretical reasons to believe it does not accurately reflect all aspects of reality in this case. Past 
research has found that one strategy NPOs use to meet government standards is to decouple what 
actually occurs from the paperwork that is required (Wiley & Berry, 2003; Fee, 2018). For 
instance, some domestic violence advocacy groups chose to bill clients to meet requirements but 
encouraged clients not to pay those bills (Wiley & Berry, 2003). Similarly, refugee-serving 
resettlement organizations often engaged in “paper integration” where reported outcomes were 
decoupled from actual conditions (Fee, 2018). While this is a possible concern, by triangulating 
information from both interviews and archival research the impact of any possible decoupling is 
minimized.  
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3. Explanation of Case 
This thesis is a case study of a small to mid-sized ethnic community-based organization 
(ECBO) in Vermont which provides multiservice social services support to New Americans. The 
social services provided by this organization include legal services, case management and 
employment services, services to senior citizens and youth, domestic violence and sexual assault 
advocacy and support, translation services, and agricultural programming (see Figure 1). This 
organization was founded in 1999 and expanded in 2009 to include all New American arrivals to 
Vermont. The organization has roughly 7 to 12 staff members including caseworkers, program 
specialists and management, all of whom hold at least a bachelor’s degree and many of whom 
who hold graduate degrees. Additionally, the organization hires many contractors who act as 
interpreters for the organization. Figure 2 shows the organizational structure of all program-level 
staff at the case study organization.  
Figure 1: Services Provided by the Case Study Organization 
Legal Services  Citizenship Instruction  Citizenship and Immigration Legal 
Services 
Youth Programming  Youth Mentoring Program 
 Youth Health Education 
Sexual Assault and Domestic Violence 
Prevention 
 Sexual Assault Survivors Support 
Groups 
 Assistance to Domestic Violence 
Survivors 
 Substance Abuse Prevention 
Activities 
Case Management  Flexible services in employment, 
housing and integration 
Employment Training  Home Healthcare Worker Training 
Agricultural Programming  Community Gardens 
 Farm Training Program 
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Interpretation Services  For-fee Interpreter Services Provided 
to Local Entities  
 
Figure 2: Case Study Organizational Chart 
 
 Generally defined, ECBOs are a particular type of NPO in which members of an ethnic 
community create and run an organization to aid other members of that community or 
communities (Jenkins, 1981). ECBOs have three defining features. First, a majority of the staff, 
clients and board are from the same ethnic group or groups (ibid). Second, ECBOs usually 
incorporate various aspects of their ethnic culture or cultures into programming, such as 
providing culturally-specific food, recognizing culturally-specific holidays, and providing 
bilingual services (ibid). Finally, ECBOs emphasize building ethnic pride and consciousness 
through representation and leadership of people from the same ethnic groups the ECBO is 
created to support (ibid).  
Not all ECBOs are focused on providing social services, with the most common forms of 
ECBOs being religious and cultural institutions (Lee & De Vita, 2008). However, among social-
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service ECBOs there tends to be an emphasis on providing a broad range of services to the 
communities they serve (Vu et. al., 2017). Often, ECBOs will attempt to provide a fully 
integrated approach to client needs, even if those needs are not considered part of the formal 
scope of the organization (Jenkins, 1981 p. 48-49). ECBOs typically have smaller budgets than 
mainstream NPOs and the level of funding and activity of these groups tend to be tied to waves 
of immigration or resettlement, with ECBOs being more active when people are first arriving 
(Lee & De Vita, 2008; Hung, 2007).   
ECBOs are generally well-equipped to provide culturally appropriate services for newly 
arrived refugees and immigrants. Since the staff of ECBOs tends to be from the same ethnic 
group as the clients, individual staff members are generally more able to provide culturally 
responsive services as they share a similar cultural context (Vu, Nguyen, Tanh & Chun, 2016; 
Jenkins, 1981). Moreover, since ECBOs boards and leadership are typically from similar ethnic 
backgrounds as the clients, the organization as a whole is organizationally culturally competent 
as it better reflects the community it is serving (Vu et. al., 2016). The case study organization fits 
this definition, with most of the staff and board coming from various immigrant backgrounds.  
While the organization studied in this case primarily serves refugee clients, they are not 
directly involved in the refugee resettlement process. In the U.S. the process of refugee 
resettlement relies heavily on NPOs. At the national level, nine volunteer agencies (VOLAGs) 
are responsible for working with the government and local actors to place refugees in various 
communities in the US (Bruno, 2011; U.S. Office of Refugee Resettlement, 2012). In many 
states, including Vermont, once refugees are placed in a community, a local branch of the 
national VOLAG is responsible for providing for initial resettlement needs (Bruno, 2011; U.S. 
Office of Refugee Resettlement, 2015). Under the Wilson-Fish program, refugees are provided 
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initial cash and medical support with the primary aim of achieving economic self-sufficiency 
through employment as soon after resettlement as possible through a local NPO (Bruno, 2011). 
Depending on the type of assistance, refugees are typically only eligible for assistance for the 
first 3 or 5 years after arrival (ibid). In Vermont, these initial services are provided by the 
Vermont Refugee Resettlement Program (VRRP) which is associated with the national VOLAG 
the U.S. Commission of Refugees and Immigrants (USCRI, n.d.).  
In contrast, the organization being studied in this case provides additional social service 
support to refugees outside of the VOLAG resettlement structure. In the context of refugee 
resettlement, ECBOs take on 5 distinct roles (Newland, Tanaka, & Barker, 2007). They act as 
service providers, a political representative for their community, a community center, 
intermediaries between government and refugee communities, and partners of the voluntary 
agencies and government organizations (ibid). The case study ECBO performs most of these 
roles. While the most visible role of the organization is as a service provider, through their case 
management and legal services programs they also act as both intermediaries and as political 
advocates for New American clients. In addition to running community center programs for 
youth and senior citizens, the organization also serves as an informal community center where 
people can walk in and find needed information and support. Finally, the case organization acts 
as a partner to government agencies by taking on government contracts and grants as part of their 
funding.  
Funding for the organization’s programs comes from a mix of sources. For the most 
recent years for which data is available, the organization took in about one million dollars in 
revenue for programs and overhead expenses. Some funding is available through the U.S. Office 
of Refugee Resettlement discretionary grant programs, which funds projects in eight program 
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areas for all refugees, including those who have been resettled for more than 5 years (Bruno, 
2011). Additionally, the organization receives funding through a number of federal, state, and 
local grants that are not explicitly for refugees, such as grants for supportive services to survivors 
of domestic violence. Overall, federal and state grant money make of the majority of the 
organization’s budget for years in which data is available. They also receive funding through 
private grants, donations and from contracts to provide interpretation services. In particular, 
interpretation services make up the second largest source of program funding for the case study 
organization.  Thus, while not directly involved in the process of resettling refugees, this 
organization plays an important role in providing additional and continuing services for refugees. 
Additionally, because of their diverse funding sources they are able to provide services for other 
immigrants, asylum seekers, and refugees that have been resettled more than 3 or 5 years ago.  
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4. Background of Immigration and Refugee Policy 
The modern refugee resettlement program was created by the Refugee Act of 1980. 
While the program has often been seen as a humanitarian initiative, the resettlement process 
within the United States is actually largely reflective of a neoliberal policy priority that refugees 
should be self-sufficient as soon as possible (Benson, 2016).  
The basic structure of refugee resettlement is complex and involves many actors at the 
federal, state and local level. Once refugees arrive in the United States, resettlement is handled 
by 2 agencies, the Department of State (DOS) and the Office for Refugee Resettlement (ORR) 
which is part of the Administration for Children and Families (ACF) (United States Government 
Accountability Office, 2012). Both programs rely on NPOs as an integral part of resettlement 
(ibid). As part of the Reception & Placement Program, the DOS has contracts with 9 national 
NPOs, known as voluntary agencies, which consult with DOS to determine the placement of 
refugees throughout the United States (ibid; Office of Refugee Resettlement, 2012). Local 
partners of the national voluntary agencies are then paid per refugee resettled to provide initial 
resettlement assistance for the first 30-90 days (ibid). ORR may also provide matching grants to 
support initial resettlement (ibid). After initial resettlement, ORR is responsible for longer-term 
refugee assistance (ibid). ORR programs provide initial cash and medical assistance for 8 months 
after resettlement, money which is distributed through the states to refugee resettlement 
organizations (ibid). ORR also provides refugee social service and discretionary grants to states 
who then typically pass on this funding to refugee-serving NPOs (ibid). While states have some 
flexibility with how they use this funding, typically these funds are used to support quick initial 
employment and English-language learning programs. With limited exceptions, ORR funding 
cannot be used to support refugees who have been in the US for more than 5 years (ibid).  
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Figure 3: Structure of Refugee Resettlement Program 
 
Note: Information from the Government Accountability Office (2012). 
 The structure of the program as defined by the 1980 Refugee Act reflects the neoliberal 
priorities of the creators of the policy. In the “roll-out” phase of neoliberalism, market logics are 
applied to the state and the services it provides, transforming them from welfare and collectivist 
institutions into marketized ones (Peck & Tickell, 2002). While in the market sector 
neoliberalism has often been associated with deregulation, Peck & Tickell argue that 
neoliberalism actually exists as a form of “metaregulation, a rule system that paradoxically 
defines itself as a form of antiregulation” (ibid, p.400). In terms of social policy, this manifests as 
a system in which responsibility for providing social services is devolved to state governments 
and often administered privately through NPOs or for-profit organizations (FPOs) while at the 
same time federal regulations require aggressive neopaternalistic sanctioning of clients who are 
perceived as noncompliant (ibid). Most typically, neoliberal social policy emphasizes harsh 
sanctions when clients fail to act as ideal market actors, such as when clients are unemployed but 
seeking welfare benefits (ibid).  
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Benson argues that the Refugee Act of 1980 replicates these neoliberal ideals in four key 
ways (Benson, 2016). First, it devolves authority from the federal level to the state level. The law 
does not set out specific mechanisms for refugee resettlement, but instead requires each state to 
provide a plan for how they will resettle refugees (ibid). In addition to devolution, the 1980 
policy also promotes the privatization of services (ibid). The law explicitly stipulates that 
services should be provided by private NPOs as well as public agencies (ibid). In doing so, it 
reflects the neoliberal sensibility that private agencies are inherently more efficient than public 
agencies (ibid). This system allows for more adjustment to local context but at the cost providing 
consistent and equitable services to all refugees (ibid; Hasenfield & Garrow, 2012). Some 
authors have argued that this pattern of privatization and devolution degrade the idea of social 
citizenship and rights (Hasenfield & Garrow, 2012). When services are devolved to the local 
level, social rights become contingent on local political and bureaucratic processes and when 
they are privatized it diminishes the sense that the state is obligated to provide these services 
(ibid; Smith & Lipsky, 1993). 
 A third major tenet of neoliberalism the law embraces is managerialism and new public 
management (NPM) (Benson, 2016). Throughout the process of creating and implementing the 
law, the primary emphasis was on reducing costs as much as possible, rather than on successful 
integration (ibid). Notions of privatization were thus combined with notions of managerialism to 
suggest a marketized system in which private agencies would provide flexible and cheaper 
services (ibid). Under the provisions of the Refugee Act of 1980, NPO outcomes are monitored 
at the state and federal level to ensure efficacy and efficiency (ibid).  Consistent with the 
ideological aims of the policy, the main emphasis is on providing cost-efficient services, rather 
than on providing the most useful services (ibid).  
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 Fourth, the Refugee Act of 1980 reflects neoliberal ideas about welfare dependency and 
the need for “workforce” (Benson, 2016). Throughout the process of developing the act, a 
persistent concern of legislators was that providing services to refugees would create 
“dependency” and harm individual’s ability to become self-sufficient (ibid). Even proponents for 
providing public benefits to refugees echoed this neoliberal logic, claiming that refugees should 
be eligible for public benefits because they were eager and industrious workers (ibid). In this 
sense, advocates for refugee social services argued for social services from a neoliberal 
foundation that the poor must be “worthy” in order to receive services, rather than a more 
fundamental argument that people have a right to have their basic needs fulfilled (ibid; 
Quintiliani, 2009). Ultimately, the law originally provided welfare benefits for just three years 
after arrival with the belief that doing so would limit dependency (ibid).  
 The perceived need to avoid creating “dependency” remains the main emphasis behind 
refugee social services. Since 1980, the period of eligibility for initial welfare has been shortened 
to just eight months (Haines, 2010). Officially, the primary goal of the ORR is to ensure 
economic self-sufficiency (Haines, 2010). In practice, economic self-sufficiency is broken down 
into two discrete goals: reducing dependency on government benefits and rapid employment 
(ibid). Data collection efforts further bolster the emphasis on self-sufficiency as defined by 
reduced dependency and rapid employment. ORR emphasizes the collection of short-term 
employment outcomes and does not attempt to measure integration overall (United States 
Government Accountability Office, 2012). By prioritizing data on short-term employment 
outcomes, the success of the refugee resettlement program overall becomes ever-more 
increasingly defined by short-term employment success alone (Haines, 2010). This can often trap 
refugee households in low-paying employment, as they will lose access to benefits if they remain 
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unemployed to pursue education and workforce training (Office of Government Accountability, 
2012). Moreover, this has the impact of essentially defining refugee social services as program 
failure, because if a refugee is receiving social services, they are not self-sufficient and thus the 
program has failed (Haines, 2010). In this way, the very act of providing or receiving social 
services is cast in a negative light, even when those services aid integration or long-term 
economic mobility (ibid). 
According to Haines, another impact of the Refugee Act of 1980 was to define refugees 
as permanent immigrants on the path to citizenship (Haines, 2010). While defining refugees as 
permanent residents created important paths to citizenships and rights it also created expectations 
for incoming refugees. As immigrants, refugees are expected to be grateful for the opportunity to 
come to America (ibid). Moreover, it is assumed that they should try to capitalize on this 
opportunity by pursuing economic and social mobility at all costs (ibid). This creates a 
fundamental paradox for refugees and those serving them. By definition, a refugee is in need of 
assistance because of circumstances outside of their control, but they must not be considered 
“needy” or else risk being perceived as dependent (ibid).  
The structure and ideological impact of the Refugee Act of 1980 has had three major 
impacts on NPO service providers. On one hand, it established NPOs as a crucial partner and 
provider of resettlement services (Benson, 2016; Office of Government Accountability, 2012). 
On the other, it rhetorically suggested that continuing to provide services or providing too many 
services would be a failure of the program (Haines, 2010). Moreover, NPOs were explicitly 
blamed for providing too many services, with lawmakers arguing that refugee-serving NPOs had 
created a mentality of entitlement or dependency among refugees (ibid). Finally, its funding 
structure, in which funding is only provided to recently arrived refugees, made refugee-serving 
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NPOs particularly vulnerable to reductions in the number of new refugees entering the United 
States each year (Darrow, 2015). 
Welfare and immigration reform in the 1990s further reflected neoliberal ideas that 
immigrants and refugees should be self-sufficient and not be allowed to access public benefits. 
The Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Act was passed into law by Congress in 
1996. As a whole, the rationale behind welfare reform is based on the neoliberal ideal that 
poverty is not the result of structural factors like economic conditions or racism, but instead 
reflects a personal and cultural moral failing (Katz, 2013). By redefining poverty as a moral 
issue, politicians and activists for welfare reform were able to justify heavy-handed neopaternal 
methods of social control through welfare to sanction the unemployed (ibid; Peck & Tickell, 
2002). Welfare reformers frequently called to mind the racialized and gendered framing of the 
“welfare queen”, women who had children in order to receive benefits, as a justification for why 
reform was necessary (Fujiwara, 2005). 
 PWORA had two main impacts for refugees and immigrants. First, legal permanent 
residents (LPRs) became ineligible for almost all major categories of welfare benefits for at least 
five to seven years, including SSI, TANF, SNAP and Medicaid (Siskin, 2016). Exceptions to this 
policy highlight the emphasis the policy has on the work requirements. For example, LPRs are 
eligible for SSI if they have at least 40 quarters of valid U.S. work history as an LPR (ibid).  
Unlike LPRs, refugees remain eligible for most programs for at least five to seven years 
after arrival (ibid). However, the requirement to find work to continue being eligible for benefits 
has had a major impact on many refugee families, particularly for refugee women (Quintillani, 
2009). In a longitudinal study of Cambodian refugee women, Quintillani found that many faced 
multiple systemic barriers to meeting the work requirements for TANF, including the need to 
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provide childcare, lack of transportation, and having “under the table” jobs like sewing 
piecework that could not be counted towards the work requirement (ibid). Furthermore, many 
women struggled with mental health issues as a result of their refugee experience which made 
consistent work difficult (ibid). Despite these struggles, the women feared that questioning the 
system could result in their benefits being eliminated (ibid). Thus, while refugees are eligible for 
most welfare services under PWORA, the “workfare” requirements are particularly difficult for 
refugees to meet.  
After the passing of PWORA, activists were able to win limited concessions in the law 
through strategic activism (Fujiwara, 2005). To achieve this, they relied on two framings of 
immigrants that countered the narrative of the undeserving “welfare queen”. First, activists 
focused on the impact the law had on elderly and disabled immigrants (ibid). Second, they 
emphasized Hmong refugees as worthy of receiving benefits because of the direct impact that 
American military involvement in Southeast Asia had on their need to flee to the United States 
(ibid). While these framings helped restore critically needed benefits, they also had the impact of 
reconstructing certain immigrant populations as victims and “good citizens” while tacitly 
implying that other immigrants may not be “worthy” of social benefits (ibid). Perceived 
“worthiness” has been an important part of political support for social benefits and services for 
immigrants, and especially for refugees. In the 1970s and 1980s, Southeast Asians were 
perceived as “worthy” of social support both because they were fleeing communism but also 
because many perceived the US as being at least partially responsible for the destabilization in 
the region (Haines, 2010). This can lead to disparities in level of political support for admitting 
various refugee groups (Haines, 2007). In the modern era support for Central American asylum-
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seekers is much higher than support for Syrian refugees, perhaps in part because of this 
(Mccarthy, 2018).  
 Racist and Islamophobic fears that refugees from the Middle East represent a security 
threat may also reduce political support for Middle Eastern refugees. In 2017, 46% of Americans 
felt that Iraqi and Syrian refugees posed a major threat to the United States (Smith, 2017). These 
fears are unfounded and there is no evidence to suggest refugees pose a threat to U.S. security 
(Zolberg, 2007).  
Welfare reform and the resulting reduction in social benefits for immigrants and refugees 
has had consequences for refugee and immigrant-serving NPOs. Most significantly, a decrease in 
government social benefits and services puts pressure on NPOS to close the gap by providing 
needed services. Additionally, these restrictions could prevent NPOs from leveraging Medicaid 
to provide mental health and addiction services. This could be especially damaging as this 
strategy of billing to Medicaid is often used by NPOs to compensate for limited funding in other 
areas (Smith & Lipsky, 1993). On a more general level, these reforms continued to reinforce and 
codify the political perspective in which immigrants and refugees are not seen as “deserving” of 
social support which has long-term implications for many types of government funding that 
refugee and immigrant-serving NPOs rely upon. 
Anti-immigrant and refugee rhetoric and decreased support for social services for these 
groups has become even more pronounced since the beginning of the Trump Administration. 
While overall support for admitting refugees has stayed relatively stable since the beginning of 
the Trump presidency, views have become increasingly polarized with 9% fewer Republicans 
saying that the US has a “responsibility to accept refugees” in 2018 than in 2017 (Hartig, 2018). 
Trump himself has shown hostility towards immigrants and refugees as both a candidate and a 
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president. Trump has frequently attacked refugees and immigrants as an economic cost. As a 
candidate in 2016, he criticized Hillary Clinton’s refugee plan because it would, in his 
estimation, have a “LIFETIME COST OF OVER $400 BILLION.” (Trump, 2016). As a 
president, he has taken steps to try to change the definition of “public charge” to include non-
cash social services like SNAP or Section 8 Housing, which would prevent many immigrants 
from adjusting to LPR status (Shear & Baumgaertner, 2018).  
Trump has also frequently claimed that refugees and immigrants represent a security 
threat to the United States. In 2015, he implied that some refugees “could be ISIS” (Trump, 
2015). Since being in office, he has restricted travel and many types of immigration from seven 
mostly Muslim-majority countries with various executive orders (Shear, 2017). In 2017, he 
called refugees from the seven mostly Muslim-majority countries “DANGEROUS” (Trump, 
2017). The idea that refugees are a major security threat is not based in empirical reality, as 
temporary travel visas are millions of times more common and the danger of someone entering 
the US through the highly vetted refugee program is small (Zolberg, 2007). 
Since taking office Trump has taken many steps to slow and even shut down the refugee 
and asylum process. First, as part of the overall travel ban, Trump closed the refugee program for 
180 days in 2017 and imposed additional 90 day bans on refugees from 11 countries (Shear, 
2017). While the refugee program has since reopened, Syrian refugees are still effectively barred 
from entry with just 62 Syrian refugees being resettled in FY 2018 (Amos, 2018). Second, 
Trump has drastically reduced the maximum cap on the number of refugees (Hirschfeld Davis, 
2018). Even under the Bush administration, when the actual number of refugees admitted to the 
US dropped significantly, the refugee cap was typically around 70000 to 80000, but Trump set 
the 2018 cap to 45000 and the 2019 cap to just 30000 (ibid). Figure 4 shows a graph of the 
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changes in refugee cap and number of refugees admitted since the inception of the modern 
refugee program in 1980. 
 
Note: Adapted from the Migration Policy Institute (2018). 
Third, the entire refugee program has been under an “administrative slowdown” (Robbins 
& Jordan, 2018). Thus, despite the cap of 45000, only 17113 refugees entered the US in 2018 
(UNHCR, 2019). There are three primary reasons for this administrative slowdown. First, 100-
215 refugee officers were diverted to hear asylum causes because of the massive backlog in 
asylum cases (Robbins & Jordan, 2018). Second, the Trump Administration has raised vetting 
requirements by requiring additional vetting for refugees from 11 “high-risk” countries and 
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extending vetting to females 15-40 (ibid). Finally, there is simply a lack of administrative 
pressure from the executive branch to meet the refugee cap (ibid). 
Asylum cases are also being processed very slowly with a large and growing backlog of 
800000 cases (Lu & Watkins, 2019). Moreover, the Trump administration has made several 
attempts to limit the ability to apply for asylum. In June, then Attorney General Sessions 
announced that fleeing domestic violence would no longer be a reason to claim asylum (Benner 
& Dickerson, 2018). In November of 2018, Trump attempted to suspend the asylum process for 
anyone entering across the border illegally through an executive order (Shear & Sullivan, 2018). 
This was blocked by a federal judge as it would place a “categorical bar” on asylum and thus 
violate Congressional law (Jordan, 2018). Finally, Trump’s original border wall proposal would 
have limited asylum applications for Central American children (Rose, 2019). 
These actions have had a major impact on the ability of refugee-serving NPOs to assist 
their clients. Funding for refugee resettlement organizations (RROs) coming from the State 
Department’s Resettlement and Placement Program is directly dependent on the number of 
refugees who are resettled in the area (Darrow, 2015). This creates inherent instability for these 
organizations, as RROs rely on this funding not only to serve clients but also to pay for staffing 
and administrative costs, and this instability is particularly bad for smaller RROs (ibid). With the 
reduction in numbers of refugees in the United States, more than 20 RROs have closed and 40 
more have been told they must shrink in size (Rosenberg, 2018). When RROs close, refugees 
that are already resettled become effectively “stranded” without a central location to receive 
services (ibid). Moreover, the closure of RROs will have a long-term negative impact on the 
capacity of communities to receive more refugees even if a future president was to want to 
increase the refugee cap (ibid). While the impact on non-RROs like the case study NPO is less 
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clear, they are also likely to have difficulty finding funding as less refugees enter the United 
States, as many types of funding are contingent upon providing services to a certain number of 
recently-arrived refugee clients. Moreover, the portion of funding for the US Refugee 
Admissions Program coming from the Department of Health & Human Services (HSS) 
decreased from $2.122 billion in 2017 to $1.457 billion in 2018 (U.S. Department of Health & 
Human Services, 2018). 
Neoliberal ideals have been at the heart of the refugee resettlement program and 
immigration law more generally since the 1980s. “Workfare” and eligibility requirements 
associated with the Refugee Act of 1980 and PWORA have furthered the political narrative that 
refugees and immigrants are must be “worthy” in order to receive social services. The Trump 
administration has rhetorically built off this narrative, accusing the refugee program of being a 
financial burden. Moreover, he has labelled immigrants and refugees as dangerous and 
potentially terrorists. Through the travel ban, reduction in the refugee cap, and administrative 
slowdown the Trump administration has effectively slowed the number of refugees resettled to 
the US to significantly less than any year prior with disastrous impacts on the available funding 
for refugee-serving NPOs.  
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5. Findings  
 Based on the interview and archival research I conducted on the case study organization, 
I find 11 main themes which can be broadly grouped into 4 categories. Themes I though III 
explore the ability of NPOs to make changes to programs awarded by government grants. I find 
that opportunities for an NPO to shape program outcomes are limited during the original grant 
awarding process but expand significantly once an organization has been awarded a grant, and 
especially during the grant renewal process.  
Themes IV through VI examine how government partners hold NPOs accountable and 
sanction them for perceived noncompliance to the terms of government contract and grants. This 
research suggests that informal mechanisms of accountability, such as not renewing a grant and 
providing warnings and technical support to struggling organizations are more commonly used 
than the formal measures outlined in the grant procedures. Additionally, I find that the use of 
these informal mechanisms varies based on the level of trust between NPO and government 
partner, although formal mechanisms remain largely the same for all organizations.  
Themes VII and IX describe how the case study NPO seeks to exert its own autonomy 
and mission. I find that the NPO uses private funding and information asymmetry to expand 
eligibility and program offerings consistent with its mission, but still feel constrained by their 
reliance on government funding.  
Finally, themes X and XI examine the extralocal forces which impact the autonomy of 
both NPO staff and government partners. I find that government partners often wish to give 
NPOs more autonomy but are prevented to doing so by state and federal mandates, and that these 
accountability expectations are becoming stricter over time.  
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I. New Grant Funding Usually Follows a Competitive or Negotiated Request for Proposals 
(RFPs) System  
Overwhelmingly, government partners expressed that the process of determining who 
receives grants should be objective and competitive. Officials asserted that considering the 
strength of a relationship would be unfair and that they felt they should not consider such factors. 
Most considered it critical that all organizations had the chance to apply for funding and try to 
ensure this by distributing request for proposals (RFPs) as widely as possible. 
Government officials also oftentimes used the competitive contracting model, most 
typically when they were providing new funding or starting a new program where there was 
likely to be many qualified NPOs able to do the work. In almost every interview, government 
partners described a process whereby an RFP for a new program is widely distributed, with the 
subsequent applications being read and scored by a team of government reviewers whose score 
acts as a recommendation for the grant manager. In one case, for a smaller grant, the grant 
manager was the sole decider of who received funding. 
 While most partners tried to avoid considering the interpersonal relationship between 
them and the applying NPO, the NPO’s reputation and past performance were considered in 
many cases. At least one government funder explicitly used an organization’s prior granting 
experience in evaluating and scoring grant proposals because: 
I know how they work and I know what kind of work they do… [if] they're able 
to manage a grant or not… and also their knowledge of the population and access 
to it.  
 Government Official  
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 For at least some government grantors, success at past work serves as one useful heuristic 
for whether they are capable of doing similar work in the future. While other government funders 
rejected a broader consideration of the reputation or past success of an NPO, even some of these 
officials considered whether an NPO grantee was previously delinquent in meeting the terms of 
other grants it held with the state. 
 In these competitive RFP processes, the terms of the grant are generally set unilaterally 
by the government partner, with NPOs being expected to explain how they could conform to the 
terms of funding. Government officials frequently described looking for NPOs “capacity to do 
the work” not just in terms of programmatic capacity, but also in terms of being able to deal with 
the administrative and financial burden of grant reporting. Some government partners use the 
formatting of the application itself as a test of administrative sophistication. For example, one 
partner uses the following test: 
 If we said we want a budget to be proposed in two different ways did we get it in 
both ways? 
 Government Official  
 
Another official described: 
 [P]aying attention to the professionalism of the proposal… and format of the 
application. 
 Government Official  
 
 This competitive model limits the autonomy of NPO staff to be involved in shaping the 
process and can lead to frustration on the part of the NPO grantee. For example, one case study 
NPO staff member explained that meeting the terms of a grant was difficult because the research 
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used to shape the terms of the grant didn’t reflect the reality of the situation, something which he 
felt could have been avoided if the grantors had: 
[Gone] out and ask[ed] people who they think could get the money to…design the 
program, design the RFP or the grant money, which would target the problem 
based on the reality. 
 NPO Staff 
One government official did report that she would include community members on the 
grant review panel in some cases.  
While almost all government officials reported that they used some version of this 
process for some of their new grants, many use a more negotiated approach in certain scenarios. 
In some cases, government partners described being restricted to certain NPO partners by the 
state or federal government. In these cases, government officials typically still require a formal 
work plan, but this process is more frequently described as a negotiation, with the NPO in 
question being involved in defining the exact scope of work. One official explained that: 
The department will say we want to give money to this entity, but we just need 
them to come up with a plan. 
 Government Official  
Thus, while NPOs in this situation are still expected to meet certain government 
requirements, and are held equally accountable, they may have more latitude to define the 
specific services they intend to provide or how they intend to provide them than NPO applicants 
in a more competitive grant process.  
Government partners also recognized that for some services, there was unlikely to be 
many interested agencies. Multiple officials recognized that the more specialized the service was, 
the less likely it was to be a highly competitive process: 
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I think it really depends on the service you are looking for. If you're sending out a 
request for… a commodity, then you going to get a whole myriad of responses to 
that. If you're looking for something very specific… there's a very limited number 
of… entities that would respond to that… Going into that I think we fully expect 
and can kind of guess at what kind of a response we're going to get. 
 Government Official 
In some cases, there may even be only one entity that meets the qualifications:  
Generally, the more specialized it is, the less competitive it is…the only 
organization that is qualified to provide [service] is [case study NPO]… so I know 
full well that when I issue [an RFP] they are going to apply and they’re going to 
get the funding. 
 Government Official  
In these cases, the grant is still open for anyone to apply, but on a practical level it is 
understood that the process will not be competitive because of the specialized nature of the 
services requested. Thus, while government partners generally desire and attempt to use a 
competitive contracting model for new grants, sometimes practical concerns or outside 
influences lead to them using a more negotiated model. In these cases, the NPO partner may hold 
greater influence over how the program is developed and run than they would in a traditional 
competitive RFP process. 
II. Scope of Change: Minor Changes Versus Major Changes  
 Many government partners and NPO staff identified the scope or scale of changes as an 
important factor for determining whether an NPO partner would be allowed to make changes to 
programming. One NPO staff member explained:  
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I think people are generally open to [making changes] if you can provide a pretty 
good explanation as to why. And it's like we're not talking about major changes to 
a grant, we’re just talking about sort of shifting emphasis or finding that there was 
more need for X and so we put more resources into accomplishing this other 
thing. 
 NPO staff 
 Additionally, NPO staff noted that the amount that a project focus could shift depends on 
the size of the grant. With a larger grant, larger amounts of money can be shifted into different 
program areas without needing to justify that choice as much. Oftentimes, money can be shifted 
by a set percentage between different expenses originally enumerated in the grant, usually by 
10% of the total funding.  
 The case study organization’s past grants show many examples of these small changes to 
programming. In some cases, the organization got prior approval for a change, such as a formal 
exemption from the requirement to use volunteer labor for a particular grant because of the 
specific cultural and language-needs of the client population. In other cases, changes were 
evidently small enough that they could be made without prior approval and then reported to the 
government funder. For example, in one classroom-style program, facilitators reported making 
curriculum changes to increase the cultural competence of the programming and address new 
topics relevant to the clients. These changes were made and then reported in quarterly reports. In 
this case, it was clear that the government funder approved of these changes because it was 
specifically mentioned as a positive in the site visit review of the program. Thus, there is 
significant evidence that NPO staff can and do make small-scale changes with varying levels of 
involvement of government funders. 
 Almost all government partners made the distinction between small-scale changes, which 
they would generally accept, and large-scale ones, which they generally would not accept. 
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Government funders explained that: 
[I]t really comes down to scope of work… if the partners asking us can we limit 
or expand this piece? Versus we don't want to do this anymore, we want to do 
this. …Example B probably won't get much of a discussion. Example A it will at 
least be reviewed and… if it works then we can implement it. 
 Government Official  
 
 If it's not too big of a change I will approve it if I think it makes sense, but then 
we need to do a grant amendment. 
 Government Official  
 In almost all cases, government funders still described needing to do a formal process of 
making a grant amendment in these cases. But most were willing to accept small-scale changes 
provided the NPO can explain why such a change is needed.  
III. The Grant Renewal Process: A Site for Negotiating Programmatic Changes  
 While the RFP process for new grants is relatively formalized, the process of renewing a 
grant is sometimes more informal and often relies on negotiation. Both NPO staff and 
government funders described grant renewal as the optimal time for making adjustments to a 
grant. One reason for this is that waiting over the course of a year allows the government funder 
to request and receive data on the possible change. As one government partner explains: 
I can say that we’re really big on having conversations within our division, with 
our partners, in making sure we are having open communication… And a lot of 
times we need to have some data in order to make decisions about whether or not 
[the NPO partner] should make a change… I think I’m pretty well known for 
saying we’ll see how this year goes and then [when] we’re doing grant 
negotiations we can revisit and see if that makes sense to keep in there or not. 
 Government Official  
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Government staff also cited the grant renewal process as an area where they had more 
discretion to negotiate with NPO partners than they would in a new RFP process. 
Now with existing grantees we’re funding often there's some discretion… they 
could make a request to change how they're using the funding or we can typically, 
if we have a grant that is focused on a particular topic, if we wanted to add more 
money focus[ed] on that same topic we can…as a grant manager make that 
decision. 
 Government Official  
NPO staff also acknowledged that the grant renewal process was a time for negotiating 
changes. As one staff member explained about the renewal process for a multi-year grant: 
Based on the evaluation…we had so many requests or… recommendation that we 
have made in order to change or to modify… the grant from this for the second 
year. But not for the year that we were working on. 
 NPO Staff 
In this situation, an outside evaluation allowed the NPO staff member to provide the 
necessary data to lead to changes in the program. But he expressed that he would have rather 
been able to make this change for the first year, because he was already aware of problems with 
the grant requirements. In this sense, NPO staff are therefore limited in making changes. Even 
when they have identified a problem, they may not be able to make changes in the program 
immediately because of the requirement to collect information and data on the scale and scope of 
the problem.  
An additional limitation of NPO staffs’ ability to negotiate is an inability to collect that 
necessary data to negotiate a change because of resource and capacity constraints. One NPO staff 
member explained that: 
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We have not been taking a lot of pause in between… say stage one of the 
program, to reflect and see what we can change… I think what we have been 
focusing on is, you know, just we have this to achieve. We have to- this funding is 
going to run out in three months and we've just been in the role of, we're going to 
do what we said we were going to do, we're just providing services and not really 
reflecting to see what can we change… I think it's a function of time as well as 
just the human resources, that capacity. 
 NPO Staff 
 Thus, while government partners may be more open to renegotiating the terms of a grant 
during the renewal process, it is not necessarily possible for NPOs to collect the information 
needed to make these changes. Furthermore, even if an NPO is able to request and negotiate a 
change during the first year of the grant, there is still an emphasis on needing to collect data. 
Both government partners and some NPO staff were resistant the idea of major changes to a 
grant within the first year. One government funder explained: 
If you are materially changing the scope of an agreement, especially a short-term 
agreement, one year, maybe even two-year then you haven't done a very good job 
up front… one side or the other didn’t understand what we were after. 
 Government Official  
 And while some NPO staff expressed frustration at being unable to change the terms of a 
grant, others agreed with government funders: 
Hopefully you've written a grant that… matches what you want to do. So the 
constraints are based on things that you already said and that's okay. 
 NPO Staff 
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IV. Government Sanctioning NPO Noncompliance Through Refusing Grant Renewal 
 While the grant renewal process is a site of possible NPO influence over programming, 
government partners can also refuse to renew a grant as a sanction for perceived NPO 
noncompliance or failure. For instance, one government partner explained: 
[I]f I’m working with an entity and… I found out… the feds have given me 
another 40,000 to do the same thing. If I feel this organization has been 
struggling… I would be hesitant about giving them additional funding. 
 Government Official 
 
 Similarly, other partners describe reopening funding to an RFP process when grantees are 
not meeting expectations.  
Most [grants] are just one year… but… I don’t reissue RFPs every year. So if I’m 
happy with the person or with the agency, we have the opportunity to renew… if 
that doesn’t go well, I don’t do that. I issue a new RFP.  
 Government Official 
 
 Thus, NPOs who are seen as performing to expectations have the ability to renegotiate in 
the grant renewal process. But NPOs who are not currently meeting standards are sanctioned by 
losing this opportunity. Instead, they must reenter as part of the competitive granting process. 
Once they enter this process, there is a significant chance that they will lose the grant funding, as 
multiple partners report that they will score NPOs who have been delinquent to the terms of their 
past grants lower if they reapply for the funding.  
V. Formal versus Informal Patterns of Government Sanctioning of Noncompliant NPOs  
 While government partners describe sanctioning through the grant renewal process, they 
also report much more lenient informal systems of holding NPOs accountable than are formally 
required. Almost all grants awarded to the case study organization mandate a process whereby 
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the NPO is sent a formal warning if they fail to meet government funder requirements for 
services or reporting of those services, followed by sanctions and termination of funding if the 
NPO continues to fail to meet requirements. For example, one such grant agreement describes a 
two-step process where a formal warning is sent out if the case study NPO is below 75% of the 
target numbers of various outcome measures, and then a corrective action plan is established if 
the NPO continues not to meet the targets. This formal process was also described by many 
government partners.  
 But many of the same government partners described using an informal warning and 
discussion process prior to following these formal steps. The level of informal supports varied 
somewhat. For some government partners, the main informal support is simply warning an NPO 
about the issue prior to the formal notice letter and eventual corrective action plan. But other 
government partners describe more involved informal steps involving technical assistance, phone 
calls, and site visits. Generally, these informal supports are most often extended to newer NPO 
partners, because government funders report that new grantees usually need the most support.  
However, this was not true in all cases, such as when a program had a specific time deadline or 
requirements by a federal funder that could not be altered. In these cases, government partners 
acknowledged that they tended to be harsher about meeting grant requirements. 
 In explaining their relative leniency, government partners overwhelmingly cited their 
understanding that NPOs have difficulty meeting reporting requirements for many grants 
because of their limited capacity which many described as a barrier to effective accountability:  
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I think one of the biggest struggles that I see is the grantees have a lot of small 
grants and they're often consumed with doing the work and they don't have 
dedicated staff who can make sure that reporting is done on time and correctly or 
at least they struggle to do that… And so sometimes it's a hard sense of trying to 
sort through, okay was the issue that they're doing the work but they're just, they 
need to get better at documenting it or is it that they're not doing the work? 
 Government Official  
 I actually emphasize, I understand how burdensome it can be to do this 
reporting... this is just one tiny piece, probably, of how they're funded. 
 Government Official 
 
 Like the examples government partners cite, the case study NPO is funded by a many 
small grants. While the yearly budget of the case study NPO is typically above one million 
dollars, the average yearly amount paid out by a single grant from 2015 to present is just 
$52,759.49. While NPO staff must adapt to this financial situation by managing many small 
grants, there is also evidence that government partners have adapted their expectations of 
reporting and accountability to soften the formal requirements via informal notices and the 
development of a working relationship.  
 Moreover, government partners sometimes framed their leniency in terms of their 
obligation to the general public to continue to provide services. The RFP process is inherently 
time consuming. One government partner reported that she had already begun writing an RFP for 
a grant that would not be issued for another 6 months. Thus, some government partners 
expressed a preference for working with a partially noncompliant or struggling NPO in some 
cases so that the program would continue to run without any possible significant break in 
providing services to the public: 
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We understand we have a responsibility to our partners. And, you know, and that 
at times pushes some flexibility in how we interpret things. Just because we need 
to ensure that the service can continue and a battle over a minor point is, would be 
not beneficial to anyone. 
 Government Official 
And once you've given the money to a particular entity, it's in your best interest 
to… help them succeed. And so, if… you've been working with the grantee for 
six months and they're really struggling, sometimes it's hard to decide like well do 
we just cut the funding and start over or do we… keep working on helping this 
entity going? Because, you know, if we do decide to cut the funding then the 
public is going to get no services and you have to sort of start over and try to redo 
the process. 
 Government Official  
 In both cases, government partners recognized that providing services is the primary 
purpose of the contracting relationship and were willing to be more flexible in order to achieve 
this aim. 
VI. NPO Reputation and Trust-Building Between NPOs and Government Partners Affects 
Informal Norms of Accountability but not Formal Systems 
 Many government partners reported that over time trust built between them and some of 
their NPO grantees, but while this trust may change informal norms around accountability, it 
typically does not change formal accountability requirements. As one government partner 
explains, this trust is generally built when there is a sense that the NPO grantee generally shares 
the same goals as the government grantor. 
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I think that it's as time goes and the same players are in place the relationship 
becomes based on a little more honesty and a little more integrity. You know, 
because you trust they trust and you can… play your cards a… little more, you 
can share your cards a little easier rather than hold them close to your vest when 
you truly believe that… your partner, be at the state or be it the state's partners, is 
working in the same direction. And if you feel like your partner is just trying to 
put something over or play gotcha or you know, then, then the cards aren't well 
shared. So, I would say that I can certainly see that some of the partners you've 
worked with are very, very comprehensive in terms of sharing and others hold it 
really close and are worried. And we're asking for the same thing from everyone. 
It’s just, you know, it's the nature of relationships. 
 Government Official  
 As this quote makes clear, trust does not automatically build up over time. Instead, trust 
builds only when there is a shared sense of purpose and similar goals. Similarly, another 
government partner noted that she was more lenient about errors from organizations who were 
generally good at reporting: 
And so for instance like if [case study organization] are- if they ever have like an 
error, I'm less likely to harp on it, in fact sometimes I don’t even send it back, I 
like correct it something on that reporting, like a date or something, I won’t call 
their attention to it…. I definitely… am more lenient with partners I know have it 
together versus like if I know there are some agencies that… just need more hand-
holding, or benefit from more kind of technical assistance and I’m a little more 
hands-on. 
 Government Official  
 While increasing trust can lead to more flexibility and a mutual sharing of information, 
mutual trust generally also develops because NPO partners are willing to aid and accommodate 
government partner’s needs. 
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It does have an effect… not a formal impact, everyone [has] the same 
requirements. But if I know them well, and I know I had many grants with them, I 
know that for example some grantees, if I forget to put one report [in the grant 
agreement]… that if I contact them and I say “you need this new report I’m 
sorry”, they will do it… Some others if it's not in the grant I need to make sure I 
know, because… otherwise, I won't have leverage. 
 Government Official  
In this case, NPOs who have a more trusting relationship may be more willing to comply with 
informal government requests, even those not legally required, than other organizations.
 Similarly, one government partner reported using the organization’s office space to hold 
an event as part of a collaboration. Thus, a developed relationship and trust may lead to some 
increased flexibility, but that trust usually only develops if an NPO is also willing to give 
additional resources and support to the government partner in order to build up mutual trust. 
VII. NPO Staff use Information Asymmetry to Expand Eligibility and Program Offerings  
 Both NPO staff and government partners acknowledged that NPOs had some ability to 
conceal aspects of their organization or program from government partners: 
Some grantees have people who are really good at writing. And so, they can sort 
of in the written reporting they can make it sound like things are going really well 
and maybe hide the fact that things are... that they are struggling.  
 Government Official  
 
This quote identifies hiding poor performance as the one reason for attempting to take 
advantage of the information asymmetry. However, for the case study organization, NPO staff 
primarily reported using information asymmetry to provide additional services or to extend 
services to those who were not otherwise eligible.  
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 First, NPO partners at the case study organization report going beyond the terms of the 
grant to provide additional services they feel are needed, and then not reporting those services to 
the government grantor. One staff member described trying to meet the long-term goals of a 
grant as a process of: 
 [Doing] more than what the grant wants, which we see the impact of it right 
away, but…it's hard to follow the grant requirements the way it is. So we do other 
things which is really maybe more than what they are grantor is requiring us to… 
do. 
 NPO Staff 
 
Similarly, another staff person noted that oftentimes staff would take on a grant even when there 
was no additional pay for that person’s staff hours because the case study organization: 
[Has] a really dedicated staff who will go the extra mile to take on one more 
thing. 
 NPO Staff 
 
In both cases, NPO staff is choosing to do additional work and not report it to 
government funders in order to make the program more effective. While this is not a traditional 
use of information asymmetry, it is still a method that NPO staff use to alter the type of program 
being offered. 
 A more classic example of NPO staff members use of information asymmetry is the use 
of information asymmetry to expand eligibility for programming. Many government grants have 
strict requirements for who is eligible and who is not. For the grants held by the case study 
organization these are most often based on age, income, immigration status, and the number 
years since arrival in the United States. Almost all NPO staff described some process by which 
they allowed those not eligible according to the grant to participate in some aspects of the 
program. In one case, an NPO staff member explained that she allowed those not eligible to 
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“audit” the program, participating in some aspects of the program but not receiving the same 
social services, which many of those not eligible need less anyways. Using this structure, the 
program was able to assist those who did not met eligibility requirements even though they 
cannot be counted for formal grant reporting. Another NPO staff member reported that for a 
program he runs: 
We still help [clients], but we don’t report it… we take all [clients] and try to help 
them out. 
 NPO Staff 
 
However, NPO staff did not always chose to try to expand eligibility for programs. 
Particularly, one NPO staff member explained that they did not attempt to expand eligibility 
when the eligibility requirements align with the needs of clients. While this strategy of 
expanding eligibility was not universal, when used it allows NPO staff to accurately report to 
government partners how many eligible clients they are serving, but also expand services to 
more populations. 
VIII. The Case Study NPO uses Private Funding to Supplement Eligibility and Program 
Offerings  
 In addition to simply providing services for people and not reporting them, the case study 
NPO also uses private funding to expand eligibility for programming. When government 
restrictions in eligibility were unavoidable, one NPO staff member reported that they typically 
provide those services through a different grant. 
 The organization’s grant archives show significant evidence of this strategy. For instance, 
the organization uses private funding to supplement a largely federally-funded program to 
provide similar services to non-refugee immigrants as they do refugees. Unlike when NPO staff 
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simply chose not to report non-eligible clients, in these cases the government funder is usually 
aware of the other components of the program.  
 Additionally, grants from the NPO often utilize private funding or revenue from the 
organization’s interpretation services to expand the type or amount of services they are able to 
provide. In the case of at least 4 core programs provided by the organization, there was clear 
evidence that the program was funded by a mix of private and public sources. Because grants 
with different names and titles may be applied to the same program without any formal 
recognition of this in the grant agreements themselves, it is likely that many more core services 
utilize some mix of public and private services. Oftentimes, this ability to leverage other funding 
is explicitly mentioned and advertised within the grant application as a reason the organization 
should be awarded government funding.  
 Rather than treat each grant as a separate program that needs to be administered, some 
NPO staff instead describe integrating each piece of funding into the established program base. 
[S]ince we've been around for so long we try to be a little more picky about which 
grants we want to apply for, which ones align with our program now. 
Because…we're not still building the foundation now, we're really just honing in 
on what we what we do and making sure that, you know, a lot of grants are, at 
least in this program, they can support sort of a general funding for [program 
area] and so we can apply for all of those kinds of things because we already have 
the program base established. 
 NPO Staff 
By integrating multiple sources of funding, many with different specific requirements, 
into the existing programming, NPO staff are able to balance the requirements of different 
funding sources to expand the program as much as possible. However, the need to find funding 
may sometimes lead to changes in those programs in order to receive funding:  
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A lot of times I think a nonprofit is in… the position to… need funding, [and] 
they’ll stretch pretty far out of their comfort zone to pay the bills. 
 Government Official  
There is no specific evidence that this occurs at the case study NPO. However, a staff 
member at the NPO emphasized that despite preferences for certain kinds of funding, reductions 
in levels of government funding meant that the NPO would take almost any funding they could 
get. 
IX. NPO Staff Still Feel Their Autonomy is Limited  
 While NPO staff are able to use certain strategies to alter programs and eligibility 
requirements, they still generally express frustration at the constraints and lack of autonomy 
inherent in government funding. All NPO staff expressed that the constraints of government 
funding restricted their ability to create programs that they felt would best address community 
needs. 
[I]f every nonprofit was able to just write to the government and say we need this 
money for these very specific programs that would be very different, like to, tailor 
everything we want to do based on what we think is best.  
 NPO Staff 
Generally non-government funding has more flexibility. Foundation funding, 
which we don't have a lot of, if we had… a ton of it, it would give us more 
autonomy to design programs a certain way… that translates into giving services 
as per needs. Government funding does some of that but there are certain criteria 
that we have to follow, so I find that we spend so much time actually thinking 
about are we meeting these criterias, versus, you now, what's our delivery 
outcomes? 
 NPO Staff 
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As the second quote reveals, NPO staff do not always have the ability to access private 
funding in order to try to alter programs to best fit what they believe the true needs to be, and 
they feel that government funding often fails to address the most important needs. 
X. Government Partners Face State and Federal Constraints that Limit Their Flexibility  
 Government staff also frequently reported that they lacked total autonomy to grant 
funding as they wished due to state and federal restrictions. The case study NPO receives most of 
its funding from federal sources. But about half of that federal funding is awarded by state or 
local government grants to the organization. This pass-through funding is managed at the state 
and sometimes the local level, but also comes with federal-level expectations for who the 
program will serve, in what way, and what outcomes will occur. Oftentimes, these federal 
requirements force state-level government partners to limit flexibility in what changes can be 
made to a grant:  
We have very clear federal guidance… so like some changes they might want to 
make… they just can’t make because we are told they can’t make them. 
 Government Official  
 
  Another government partner reports that she is strict on who can participate in a program 
and what activities they can conduct because if she is not: 
[W]e’re going to be audited by the feds and we’ll…lose our funding. 
 Government Official  
 Thus, even if NPO and government staff believe a program should be altered to be more 
effective, federal restrictions may prevent changes to that program.  
 Similarly, stricter and more complex accountability requirements are sometimes driven 
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by federal and state requirements or expectations. One government partner reported that despite 
attempts to make reporting requirements consistent for NPOs across years, the state agency had 
to alter these expectations to meet federal requirements. Another partner explained that her 
decision to move towards results-based accountability was at least in part driven by the fact that 
the state and federal officials wanted it. In some cases, NPO partners are required to use federal 
government reporting structures and processes directly. These federal reporting requirements can 
be very complex. The federal guidance on reporting for one state partner’s grants spans more 
than 17 pages and requires multiple semi-annual reports with specific information on the NPO 
sub-grantees outcomes.  
 Thus, even when the relationship with the direct government funder is good and both 
parties share the same aim, government partners may have to limit NPO autonomy or sanction 
them because of these requirements. One NPO staff member acknowledged that: 
 [Auditors] might have a special affinity to that kind of programming, but… you 
have to be mindful of the fact that even if your program administrator at the 
government level is very supportive of the program that they still… are held 
accountable for making sure that you are doing your work. 
 NPO Staff 
 
 However, like NPO staff, government partners still are able to exercise some discretion 
even when limited by the restrictions in federal funding. For instance, one government partner 
reported that despite limitations in funding, she was still able to make decisions about where that 
funding was placed based on perceived community need. NPO staff also reported that 
government partners were sometimes willing to use this discretion to make some program 
modifications in federally funded programs.  
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[W]ith some of the grant managers that we have worked with, we have been able 
to ask for some modifications. So, while there may be restrictions, we may have 
some room, not in all the programs… and not in all the funding, in some 
funding…we have a wiggle room to make some changes. 
 NPO Staff 
 
 State-level government funders are restricted by federal and state requirements, 
but they still retain some level of discretion and autonomy.  
XI. There is Some Evidence of an Increase in Accountability Expectations over Time 
 Some, but not all, government partners and NPO staff felt that accountability or other 
requirements had increased over time. Generally, those partners who felt that these requirements 
had increased saw this as a gradual process over time, rather than as the result of any specific 
political moment. One government partner expressed that: 
 [E]very year there’s an increased expectation of accountability… I’ve never seen 
us go backwards in terms of accountability. 
 Government Official  
Another government official reported that in terms of eligibility restrictions: 
 [The Federal funder] has been more and more restrictive over the years. 
 Government Official  
Similarly, one NPO staff member reported that: 
 [T]here’s a lot more monitoring, compliance issues. 
 NPO Staff 
 
However, she did note that this could be related to changes within the organization, rather than 
changes in government expectations.  
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 While some government partners and NPO staff reported that accountability had 
increased over time, others did not. Therefore, it may be that for some services and types of 
funding accountability and eligibility requirements have increased more dramatically than for 
other types of services.  
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6. Discussion 
There is significant evidence that refuge and immigrant social service policies follow a 
bottom-up model of implementation. NPO staff at the case study organization act in accordance 
with Lipsky’s model of street level bureaucrats because they exercise autonomy and discretion in 
who to provide limited grant resources to through altering program eligibility requirements 
(Lipsky, 2010). While, the conventional definition of a street-level bureaucrat emphasizes only 
front-line staff, because of the small size of the organization many staff act as both managers 
who negotiate grants but also as front-line service providers who determine who is provided 
services and in what quantities.  
This bottom-up policy influence is also consistent with Matland’s symbolic model of 
policy implementation, where micro-level factors are most important for determining policy 
success.  First, refugee policy is both highly conflictual and highly ambiguous. Conflict over 
refugee policy has been especially intense during the Trump administration, with multiple 
attempts to limit the number and nationalities of refugees admitted, with varying degrees of 
success (Shear, 2017; Amos, 2018; Hirschfeld Davis, 2018). However, refugee policy is also 
highly ambiguous, with government agencies not even able to define what successful refugee 
integration means (GAO, 2012).  
However, as Fyall argues, NPO street-level bureaucrats appear to have autonomy and 
discretion for somewhat different reasons than their public government counterparts. Lipsky 
argues that street-level bureaucrats gain discretion and autonomy because it is hard to measure 
social service outcomes and because there is necessarily grey area in who is eligible (Lipsky, 
2010; Smith & Lipsky, 1993). Difficulty in measuring outcomes given resource constraints is 
certainly one area where NPO staff gain discretion and autonomy. However, for NPO staff, 
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outcomes are not only intrinsically difficult to measure but also difficult for government partners 
to measure because of opportunities inherent in the contracting system. As many government 
partners acknowledged, most NPOs have difficulty dealing with complex reporting because they 
have low capacity and resources and prioritize providing services. Because of this, government 
partners often adjusted expectations for reporting and were more lenient than they are required to 
be, which may increase NPO autonomy to run the program as they wish.  
Further opportunities for NPO discretion and autonomy depend on the type of 
relationship between the funder and the NPO. The relationships between the case study NPO and 
government funders cannot easily be categorized as any one type of contracting relationship. 
Consistent with new public management (NPM) literature, government staff showed a strong 
normative preference for awarding grants through an open competitive process (DeHoog, 2012). 
Additionally, many government partners prioritized professionalism of the NPO when reviewing 
grant applications in order to ensure the NPO could successfully complete reporting 
requirements (Keevers et. al., 2008; Osburne, 2006). Although some government funders 
consider an organization’s reputation when awarding grants, unlike in a collaborative model, 
trust was generally not considered before awarding a grant. 
Within this competitive model there is some evidence that the government-NPO 
relationship follows a principal-agent model with NPO staff using information asymmetry to 
advance their own policy goals. Consistent with past research, staff at the case study organization 
used their asymmetric information advantage to provide program services to those who may not 
be eligible under government funding restrictions (Arvidson & Lyon, 2014; Trudeau, 2008). In 
this sense, NPO staff use information asymmetry to further their own mission of serving all 
immigrants, over the government’s policy goal of providing narrowly targeted services (Van 
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Slyke, 2006). However, there was little evidence of the use of information asymmetry to 
maximize personal or organizational resources. This may simply be because NPO staff are 
unwilling to admit such information. However, it also may point to the importance of 
maintaining the organization’s reputation and trust with government partners.  
NPO-government relations also contain collaborative and negotiated elements. As 
DeHoog suggests, government partners describe using the negotiated contracting model for niche 
services, in which they know what organizations will provide the services and then negotiate on 
the specifics of the contract with that organization (DeHoog, 2012). Because the case study NPO 
is able to provide niche services as an ECBO that other mainstream organizations do not, this 
may represent an additional avenue for policy influence. Moreover, negotiation and collaboration 
between government and NPO partners appears to be much more common once already in a 
grant relationship. Rather than requiring strict adherence to the terms of a grant, most 
government partners were willing to negotiate small-scale changes in a grant agreement provided 
the NPO showed evidence that those changes were necessary. This is especially true during the 
grant renewal process, which both NPO staff and government partners recognize as a site of 
renegotiation over the terms of the grant. By being able to negotiate changes in an agreement, the 
NPO is altering the overall policy, albeit on a small-scale.  
However, the influence of NPOs to actually affect change through negotiation may be 
limited because of a lack of organizational capacity and resources to fully engage in the 
negotiation process which requires having the capacity to gather data and other information to 
convince the government partner of a needed change. Furthermore, it is unclear whether NPOs 
are more or less constrained than traditional bureaucrats in making changes through this 
negotiation process. NPOs may hold an advantage in that there is a formal process of negotiation 
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for them to express their own preferences. However, unlike traditional bureaucrats who may be 
able propose program changes at any time, they are generally held to grant with a specific time 
frame and activities already agreed-on.  
Neither government partners nor NPO staff described a pure collaborative contracting 
model. All government partners emphasized that regardless of trust, the accountability 
requirements for all organizations were largely the same. However, increasing trust did seem to 
alter informal norms of accountability for government partners, with lower transaction costs and 
increased sharing on both sides for trusted partners. While this trust might lead to more 
autonomy for an NPO, government partners mostly emphasized that mutual trust allowed them 
more flexibility. NPO staff at the case study organization generally did not reference trust, which 
may indicate that trust plays a more important role for government partners than NPO staff 
because of NPOs’ asymmetric information advantage. Overall, the level of trust between an NPO 
and a government partner does not seem to have significant impacts on how policy is 
implemented.  Instead, NPO staff ability to alter public policy appears to derive mainly from 
information asymmetry, as well as more occasionally from negotiation with government 
partners.  
Beyond staffs’ influence as street-level bureaucrats, the case study NPO alters policy by 
incorporating grants into larger existing projects. The NPO typically integrates new grants into 
existing programming and only rarely creates entirely new programs. This alters public policy 
for two main reasons. First, the ability to integrate multiple services through the same 
organization and staff changes the nature of those services. As research on ECBOs suggests, by 
providing one-stop culturally responsive services, the case study NPO may provide more 
effective services than if these same services were provided by the multiple government agencies 
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who provide grant funding (Jenkins, 1981). Second, the case study NPO alters the programming 
by tailoring it to its mission. The case study NPO has a unique mission to provide services to the 
New American community with the goal of enabling opportunity and dignity. This ideological 
commitment to serving the community is evidenced in the case study organization by staff 
members willingness to do extra work to expand the scope of programs when they feel it is 
necessary. In contrast, government programs are generally created with the aim of serving the 
general public interest, as many government funders acknowledged (Smith & Lipksy, 2010; 
Fyall, 2016). NPO staff changes to programming to make it more culturally-appropriate and their 
attempts to expand eligibility and program scope demonstrate how public policy is altered 
because it is implemented through an organization with a specific ideological mission.  
The case study NPO is able to further alter policy by extending project scope and 
eligibility by funding programs with both government and private funding. That is, the 
organization played “the walnut shell game” by using various sources of funding to stay 
compliant to the terms of the government grant while also maintaining their commitment to serve 
all clients (Wiley & Berry, 2018).  
Despite these avenues for policy influence, there are also significant limitations on the 
level of NPO policy influence. While NPOs are street-level bureaucrats, this does not mean they 
are wholly in charge of making public policy. As Lipsky acknowledges, street level bureaucrats 
only make policy in “the context of broad policy structures of which their decisions are a part” 
(Lipsky, 2010, p.221). NPO staff and government partners both broadly agreed that while small-
scale changes in programming were possible and often allowed, large scale shifts in program 
focus were not. NPO staff universally expressed that if they had full control over the direction of 
programming it would significantly different. 
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Moreover, while NPO staff were sometimes able to bend eligibility requirements or 
increase program scope, there were clear dangers in trying to alter programs too much. While the 
contracting process may provide more opportunities for NPO staff to exercise discretion, the 
sanctions for noncompliance are much higher. When government partners felt that NPOs were 
unable to successfully meet the requirements for service provision and reporting of their grants, 
they were likely to eventually reengage in the competitive RFP process and give the grant to 
another organization. Thus, while staff in a hierarchal bureaucracy risk only their own 
employment when they chose to exercise autonomy and discretion, NPO staff risk both their own 
employment and the future survival of the NPO.  
Finally, NPO staff are limited in their ability to influence policy through implementation 
because state government partners are limited in their own discretion and autonomy. As Milward 
& Provan describe, the grant money awarded to the case study NPO often flows from the federal 
government, to the state through legislation or grants, and then to NPO subgrantees (Milward & 
Provan, 2000). Thus, government partners also restricted in the autonomy they can grant to NPO 
partners, regardless of the relationship between them or the shared belief that changes to a policy 
would be beneficial. Macro-level political conditions and top-down policy dictates do not 
eliminate bottom-up policy influence, but it does define and constrain the available space for 
alterations of policy. 
Generally speaking, there is a sense among at least some government partners and NPO 
staff that this space of policy influence is being reduced by increasing requirements for 
accountability and reporting documentation, as well as stricter standards for how programs must 
be constructed and run. However, these changes seem to be part of a larger trend rather than the 
result of current political conditions for refugee and immigrant policies under the Trump 
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Administration. Instead, it seems more likely that increasing expectations for accountability and 
diminishing space for NPO policy influence is the result of the larger trends of “roll-out” 
neoliberalism and NPM at the federal and state level, which values efficiency and uniformity of 
service provision over the community knowledge held by local NPO service providers (Peck & 
Tickell, 2002; Keevers et. al., 2008).   
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Conclusion 
 When NPOs act as implementors of public policy they alter or even create that policy in 
two important ways. First, front-line staff at NPOs act as street-level bureaucrats who make 
important decisions about the scope of services and who is eligible for those services. NPO staff 
hold this power in large part because the nature of the contracting relationship allows them to 
strategically conceal information from government funders. Additionally, NPO staff may gain 
policy influence by successfully negotiating for changes in programming. Second, as a whole 
NPOs alter policy by integrating government funding into already existing programming which 
aligns with the NPO’s unique mission and commitment to all New Americans.  
 However, the ability of an NPO to create or alter policy through implementation is 
limited in significant ways. While the systems of contracting and accountability provide some 
space for NPO policy creation, the threat of sanctioning by the government partner limits this 
autonomy and discretion. Moreover, while negotiation provides an avenue for policy influence, 
the scope of changes that can be made through negotiation is relatively limited. And while trust 
and a positive reputation may provide informal benefits and increase the likelihood that an 
organization receives funding, it is unlikely to result in a major extension of policy influence. 
This is in part because of state government funders own limitations in autonomy and discretion 
from the state and federal level.  
 It remains unclear how much impact the current political situation will have on refugee 
and immigrant-serving NPOs ability to create or alter public policy. Interviewees seemed to see 
macro-level trends towards greater accountability and reporting as more relevant than any 
current political events. However, this may be because interviewees were reticent to speak in 
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political terms, or because the full impact of current political events has not yet reached the street 
level.  
 This research suggests several possible policy recommendations for both government 
funders and NPOs. To some extent, significant changes in the structure of funding provided at 
the federal level would be necessary for many possible changes to the current system. But given 
the unlikely possibility that such changes will occur in the near future, there are some steps that 
NPO staff and those that wish to support their mission can take to enhance their policy influence 
and advocacy for the community. Most importantly, NPOs can increase their policy influence 
through negotiation by collecting more information on program outcomes that can be used to 
successfully make a case for changes during the grant renewal process. State government funders 
could support this effort by providing technical assistance for newer NPOs that allow them to 
more effectively collect valuable information that can be used in this negotiation process. Private 
funders could significantly increase NPO policy influence by limiting NPO reliance on 
government funding and allowing programs to be expanded and altered beyond government 
policy restrictions. Finally, as many scholars have suggested, NPOs may be able to expand their 
policy influence by advocating for policy change outside of the grantor-grantee relationship 
(Fyall, 2017). While a full examination of advocacy activities by the case study NPO was outside 
of the scope of this thesis, there is significant evidence that NPOs can benefit from advocating 
for policy change as part of larger networks of NPO service providers (ibid).  
 This research contributes to a growing body of knowledge that suggests that NPOs 
influence policy in unique ways, not just through advocacy but also through implementation of 
government contracts and grants. However, there remain many unanswered questions about the 
exact impact of NPOs in the policy process. First, because this research looks at a single case, it 
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is unclear exactly what organizational features lead to greater or less policy influence. 
Comparative research of multiple organizations could lead to further insight about what 
particular organizational features lead to the largest impact on policy. Second, this research does 
not consider the role that expectations of private funders may have on the overall aims of an 
NPO organization. Examining the combined role of government and private funder expectations 
may lead to a better understanding of how NPOs navigate multiple sets of expectations and make 
policy impacts.  
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Appendix A: Interview Guide for NPO Staff 
1. What are the funding streams for your projects or programs at AALV? What percent 
would you say come from federal grants? From state grants? From municipal grants? 
From private sources?  
 
2. How do you decide which grants or other funding opportunities to pursue?  
 
3. Does the source of the funding (eg. federal government, state government, 
nongovernmental) influence that choice, and if so how? 
 
4. What funding sources (federal government, state government, nongovernmental grants 
etc) do you feel provide you the most flexibility in deciding the goals and activities of a 
program? 
 
5. When you are applying for a government grant or contract, to what extent do you feel 
you are constrained in what activities and goals you can aim for based on the need to 
meet specific funding guidelines?  
 
6. After you have successfully won a grant or contract with a government funder, do you 
feel you are able to change the activities or goals of the program to meet the needs of 
participants? 
7. If you do make changes to programs or goals, what does the process of making these 
changes look like?  
a. At what point in the process do you inform government funders that you are 
making changes to program activities or goals? 
 
8. What do you do when people want to participate in your program but don’t meet the 
eligibility requirements set by the funders?  
 
9. What changes, if any, to this relationship have occurred since you started working at this 
position?  
  
88 
 
Appendix B: Interview Guide for Government Partners 
 
1. In your organization, who decides what non-profit organizations are awarded grants or 
contracts?  
 
2. What factors do you consider when deciding who are awarded grants or contracts?  
a. Do you consider previous partnership with a non-profit organization when 
deciding on who to award a new contract/grant to?  
 
3. What, approximately would you say is the success rate for applications to the grants and 
contracts that you manage?  How many applicants are on average successful per award? 
 
4. What is the process if a partner organization wants to change part of a program that has 
already been agreed upon as part of a contract/grant? 
 
5. What steps do you take to hold grant recipients accountable to the terms of their award?   
a. What, barriers do you see in holding grantees accountable? 
 
6. If a non-profit partner is not meeting the terms of their grant or contract what steps do 
you take? 
 
7. Does the length of time you’ve worked with a non-profit partner impact how you hold 
them accountable for a contract/grant? 
 
8. Have you observed any changes in your relationship with grantees or in the terms of your 
application, review or awarding criteria over the years? 
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